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Chapter I

Introduction

In contemporary research universities, promotion and tenure decisions
represent a major investment and have far-reaching repercussions for
the individual department and the university as a whole. A general assumption is that the academic reputation of an institution hinges on the
reputation of the faculty, an assumption upheld by several papers
([Anderson et al., 1978], [Blume and Sinclair, 1973], [Beyer and Stevens,
1977], [Crane, 1965], [Cole and Cole, 1967], [Carrter, 1977], [ Elton and
Rose, 1972], [Fulton and Trow, 1974], Gaston, 1970], [King and Wolfe,
1987], [Kroc, 1984], [Long et al., 1979], [Lightfield, 1971]).
On the contrary, Long and McGinnis [1981] found that organizational context affects scientists’ productivity rather than the scientists’
productivity affecting the prestige of the place. They found that, although
prior productivity (volume of papers published) and citations are predictors of present productivity, those positive effects disappear six years
after a person changes organizational contexts (either moves to another
position or to another university). Could this finding be an anomaly or is
it an indication of the organization’s influence on its members? Although
the authors did not say so, we might surmise a certain amount of selfselection is occurring—namely that highly motivated and productive
individuals are likely to seek jobs in places that reward those activities
and where there are others with similar attitudes; and those who change
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organizational contexts after six years do so because they have a change
in attitude and motivation.
A study by Manis (1950] concluded that “occupational and institutional conditions [such as time spent in various endeavors, research
interests and preferences, financial support of research, size of department and institution, institutional and departmental reputations, library
size] influence the volume and merit of the publishing output of individuals” [Manis, p. 1219]. This is another instance of the organizational context, culture and climate affecting “productivity.”
The logical conclusion thus, regardless of whether individual faculty research records affect the reputation of the institution or whether
the institution’s characteristics affect the individual researcher, is that
the institution’s reputation attracts other faculty and graduate students.
And institutional reputation is often related to the success of applications for external funding, which has further impact on reputation. The
award of tenure means that the university seeks to retain the faculty
member, and that retention means that the professional activities of the
tenured person contribute to the institution’s reputation and mission.
Therefore, reputation of a university is often considered to be no greater
than the “quality” of its tenured faculty.
Of the factors entering into promotion and tenure decisions in a
research university, research is considered by many to be the most important. The criteria and procedures used in arriving at these decisions
are therefore of utmost importance. Once a faculty member receives
tenure, that individual has an academic position until retirement (barring a decision to move to another university or dismissal for cause).
Once the university has committed itself to that individual, the economic
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consequences of the tenure decision often exceed $1.25 million in projected salary and benefits.
In considering tenure, decision makers must decide if the candidate will continue to contribute to the three functions of higher education and the professoriate: (1) the maintenance and storage of knowledge,
(2) the transmission of knowledge and (3) the production of new knowledge. Will she contribute to the successful transmission of knowledge?
Will she contribute to the growth of knowledge? Will she contribute positively to the institution’s reputation through her scholarship? Will she
draw other faculty to come to be her colleagues? Will she attract students
to work with her, students who will then move on to positions both
within and without higher education and further increase the
university’s standing? Will she provide meaningful service to the community and the discipline?
These questions of the individual’s contributions to the institution
are also valid with respect to Keohane’s “hybrid model” of the university
[1993], which considers the German research university grafted onto the
Oxford and Cambridge models of collegiate teaching and then given the
peculiarly American characteristic of knowledge in service to the nation:
“The modern research university is a company of scholars engaged in
discovering and sharing knowledge, with a responsibility to see that such
knowledge is used to improve the human condition.” This definition is
particularly apt for the land-grant institutions which are the subject of
this study. Keohane also noted that, with “universities under attack for
failing in our basic purposes and falling away from our historic character, it is of singular importance that we explain clearly and forcefully why
our work is crucial, and what it is we are doing that matters so much to
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the world.” The important part of the entire process, Keohane says, is the
dialogue “that comes from thinking seriously about what you are doing
in the company of others” engaged in the same activity. “The real treasure is in the activity, the exercise itself, and the enrichment of common
understanding of our purpose.”
Both tenure and the research endeavor, however, have come under
attack. Controversy abounds over the value of voluminous, specialized
research. Articles and commentaries have appeared condemning the
trivialization of research. Some researchers have examined the contribution of an active research career to dynamic teaching and have found
little correlation, despite observations to the contrary. There is a perceived rift between teaching and research. And the perception is that
faculty devote too much time to research and attendance at meetings
and conferences, with the consequence that parents and legislators think
students are slighted. Numerous articles have questioned the value of
tenure, and several states initiated movements to abolish it. Prewitt
[1994] provides a lengthy list of books that are vehemently critical of the
university, claiming they are “guilty of fraud and failure.” And although
Prewitt says this “confessional literature” is indicative of an erosion, or
even demise, of public confidence in higher education and its loss of
credibility, he finds that the opposite is in fact the case.
Political and cultural elements also impinge on perceptions of
research and the university research function. A current of pragmatism,
utility and vocationalism runs through today’s universities—all good
research is not equal, either in the eyes of those on the inside who balance the books or in the eyes of those on the outside who perceive curiosity-driven research and research in the humanities as a waste of time
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and taxpayers’ dollars. In this utilitarian view of the university, there are
many who promote it as an engine of economic development (for the local
region and for the state) and as a source of cures for society’s ills—thoroughly forgetting (or ignoring) that most of the utilitarian research they
find so valuable is ultimately based on the curiosity-driven research that
preceded it.
With respect to the economic value of research, a 1998 survey
conducted by the Education Commission of the States found that governors believe universities devote too much time to research that does not
directly benefit their states. Of interest here is the inclination of governors in the Middle Atlantic states to see their public universities as
agents of regional economic development while western governors are
more willing to countenance radical academic change (Schmidt, 1998].
We can thus infer, in light of what appears to be the increasing
importance of the practical and pragmatic, that the “responsibility to use
knowledge to improve the human condition” of Keohane's hybrid model
has become paramount in land-grant universities whose mission is service to the state. This shift in emphasis has had its impact on the stated
goals of the university. Has it also had an impact at the department and
disciplinary level?
We recall F. Burton Clark’s statement that “[a]cademic activities
are divided and grouped in two basic ways: by discipline and by enterprise.” He defines the enterprise, or individual institution, as a “comprehensive grouping, in that it links together . . . disparate specialists.” The
discipline “is a specialized form of organization” that knits together specialists across a “craftlike community of interest” rather than across a
geographic locale [Clark, pp. 28-29]. Clark says that “[d]isciplines pres-
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sure institutions to be scholarly, and sometimes to be interested in research. Institutions pressure disciplines to be student-centered, and
sometimes to be cognizant of other fields of study” [Clark, p. 32]. The two
arenas meet in a matrix structure that provides crosscutting bases of
groupings and is an organizational way to “have your cake and eat it,
too” [Clark, p. 31]. Alpert [1983] uses this matrix structure to describe
the flow of influence within and between enterprises and disciplines.
Given that enterprise and discipline are sometimes working at
cross purposes, how do they interact in the evaluation of research? It is
this dialogue between enterprise and discipline that is the subject of the
research reported here—how the two entities, the bureaucracy and the
collegium, interact with respect to goals, structure and process.

Significance
Received wisdom tells us that research and scholarship are the essence
of higher education and the research university in particular. Assuming
that research and scholarship are essential elements of the promotion
and tenure process, and that the process itself and the resultant decision
represent a major commitment on the part of the department, the college
and the university, we should have a thorough understanding of how the
components fit together and complement each other. Such an understanding may help universities perform this chore more efficiently and
effectively—if you understand where you are going and how you are
going to get there, the trip is more likely to be made with fewer pitfalls
and dead ends, with greater confidence and competence, and with more
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satisfaction for all those involved in the decision than it would be without
that knowledge.
A decade has passed since researchers have devoted any energy to
examining the methodologies and mechanisms involved in evaluating
research. In those ten years, much has changed. Universities have grown
larger, student bodies more diverse. Disciplines have grown and multiplied (and a few have all but disappeared). The explosion of knowledge
and continuing specialization of subdisciplines add to the difficulty of
finding persons expert enough to review individual work. The attitudes of
the public, the state, the federal government have changed. The
student’s approach to education has shifted. The job market in the late
1990s is no longer as fluid as it was in the early 70s when researchers
conducted many studies of productivity from many different perspectives. Funding patterns are different—federal and state spending on
research in many disciplines (notably the humanities and art) has decreased. Let us note the major exceptions of increased funding for the
National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health—but
even here, much of the funding is directed towards goal-driven and utilitarian research rather than towards the ideal of curiosity-driven research. Additionally, with the rising cost of technology, higher salaries for
academic “stars,” greatly increased costs of student services and the
increasingly competitive “market” in which universities vie with each
other for both faculty and students, many (if not most) universities now
find themselves either in or fast approaching a financial crisis.
Previous research (from the 70s and early 80s) on research evaluation is replete with articles on the number of publications produced by
faculty in various departments (especially in the business and economics
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disciplines and in psychology) and how well citations and peer evaluations correlate with raw publication counts, reputation and student
productivity. However, most of this work investigates only the input or
output, not the process itself, nor the relationships between goals, operation and structure.
Thus, it is time to take another look, and a deeper one, at a process that is ultimately so important to higher education in this country.

Problem Statement
One of the most important activities in institutions of higher education is
the promotion and tenure process. Since the goal of most institutions of
higher education is to keep (and therefore tenure) the “best” faculty, it
should be important to know what factors are the operative ones in making promotion and tenure decisions. In universities termed “research
institutions,” research and scholarship are major criteria of the promotion and tenure decision. Since most disciplines are separate (and distinct) units based in the knowledge domain and are the individual units
(or departments) that comprise the academic (rather than the financial,
service or promotional) sector of the institution, we should seek to know
how congruent the department and the institution are with respect to
reviewing or evaluating research for promotion and tenure and how their
individual structure, goals and operations interact. We thus must ask
What are the relationships, if any, between the structure, goals and
operation of the institution as a whole and the structure, goals and operation of the academic department with respect to the review of an
individual’s research for promotion and tenure decisions?
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With this question in mind, therefore, we seek to examine the
factors and considerations involved in the evaluation of research for
promotion and tenure decisions in order to develop a better understanding of how universities and departments undertake this exercise and to
examine the level of congruency between the enterprise (see definition at
end of chapter) and the departments within it. A common complaint in
recent years is the attempt to shovel all academic disciplines into the
mold of the scientific disciplines and to give greater priority and prestige
to the quantitative rather than the qualitative study. Since most landgrant universities purport to be research universities (of the 49, 1862
Morrill Act, state land-grant universities, 30 have Carnegie classification
as Research I and 12 as Research II), it behooves us to know about institutional and department-based authority structures as they relate to the
operation of the promotion and tenure decision, how departments and
enterprises determine which prospective faculty to tenure and what their
ultimate goals are. We need to understand this decision-making process
from the perspectives of both the enterprise and the department and how
these two entities interact with respect to structure, goals and operation.
Hypothesis and Research Questions
In light of the research question stated above, the working hypothesis for
this study is as follows:
The structure, goals and operation of the enterprise will affect the
structure, goals and operation of the academic department with
respect to the review of an individual’s research for promotion and
tenure decisions.
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This hypothesis leads to several research questions in two phases.

Phase I
Phase I is a content analysis of the promotion and tenure sections of
faculty handbooks at 31 state, land-grant universities. Statistical analysis of that information attempts to answer the following research questions:
1.

To what extent does structure vary with respect to size,

geographic location, history, cultural milieu, stated goals, level of operational control, and external funding in different institutions?
2.

To what extent do goals vary with respect to size,

geographic location, history, cultural milieu, and external funding
in different institutions?
3.

To what extent do operations and level of centralized control

vary with respect to size, geographic location, history, cultural milieu,
mission and goals, and external funding in different institutions?

Phase II
Phase II of the study was telephone interviews which attempted to elicit
information on the following questions:
1. To what extent are the enterprise and departmental authority
structures congruent?
2. To what extent are the goals of the enterprise and the department congruent?
3.

To what extent are the operating procedures of the enter-

prise and department congruent?

Chapter I: Introduction

4.

11

What are the most important relationships and interactions

between the enterprise and the department with respect to structure,
goals and operations?
5.

How do the actors in this process perceive its relationship to

the discipline outside the enterprise? to the institution? [This will elicit
information on the clash of values, authority structures, even goals
within the departments themselves.]

Definitions
Discipline: a specialized division based on knowledge domain. Department and discipline will be used interchangeably, recognizing that primary disciplines such as chemistry have subdisciplines such as organic
chemistry, physical chemistry and analytic chemistry that could constitute separate departments. Separate disciplines, hence separate and
distinct departments, have historically arisen as the knowledge base
expands and specialization increases and subdisciplines split into separate departmental divisions within the enterprise (a prime example is the
case of mathematics and computer science, which are two departmental
divisions in most—though not all—universities today, although at one
time they were both housed in “mathematics”).
Enterprise: an individual institution (following Burton Clark's definition), in this case an institution of higher education. In cases in which a
university has several campuses located in separate cities, the enterprise
(institution) will be the main (or home or primary) campus.

Chapter I: Introduction

12

Goals: the mission direction, stated and unstated, of the unit under
consideration. For the enterprise, preliminary analysis will consider the
institutional mission statement; interviews will attempt to uncover unexpressed agendas. At the disciplinary (departmental) level, the focus will
be, for the topic of goals, on what the evaluation of research in the promotion and tenure process is supposed to accomplish for the department
(faculty and students).

Academic Governance: the organizational and administrative features
of the university. Three primary structures will be considered here: the
bureaucratic, the shared-governance and the collegial.
Bureaucratic: Baldridge restates Max Weber's definition of a bureaucracy as an organization in which“the structure is hierarchical and
is tied together by formal chains of command and systems of communication [and] . . . involves such characteristics as tenure, appointment to
office, salaries as a rational form of payment, and competency as the
basis of promotion” [Baldridge, p. 2].

Collegium: a community of scholars in which there is full participation by the faculty and all decisions (including strictly administrative
ones) are made by consensus and grounded in the faculty’s professional
or technical competence (see [Baldridge, pp. 5-6] and [Millett, pp. 234235]).
Shared Governance: an amalgamation of the bureaucratic and
collegial authority structures in which the community of scholars makes
decisions concerning academic affairs and the bureaucratic structure of
the institution is concerned only with administrative matters. In practice,
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the actual operation of shared governance is not so clear cut. Talcott
Parsons’ 1968 paper includes a complete discussion of the organizational
structure of the American University, including the position of the lay
trustees. He calls the university a “heterocephalous, heteronomous oligarchy” [Parsons, p. 508]. Additionally, he notes that “faculties and departments . . . tend to be collegially organised rather than hierarchically
in order to create the circumstances for each member to maximise the
values of cognitive rationality” [Parsons, p. 509]. Duryea says that universities have essentially two bureaucracies, one for administrative matters and one for academic matters [Duryea, 1973]. As an historical aside,
departments as organization units in charge of academic disciplinary
matters were well established by 1900 [Duryea, p. 8], and he cites a
1910 report of physics departments that complained they had “too
much autonomy.”

Operations: the processes, mechanisms and criteria used in the evaluation of research. This includes the selection and composition of committees, the background and credentials of the committee members, the
specific criteria used in the evaluation process, how and why those criteria are selected and how they might be weighted.

Research I and Research II: the Carnegie Classifications. Research I
institutions “offer a full range of baccalaureate programs, are committed
to graduate education through the doctorate, and give high priority to
research. They award 50 or more doctoral degrees each year. In addition,
they receive annually $40 million or more in federal support.” [Chronicle
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of Higher Education, 6 April 1994] Research II institutions are described
the same as Research I institutions except for the funding criterion—
they receive annually between $15.5 million and $40 million in federal
support.

Structure or Authority Structure: the formal authority system that
governs the functioning of the unit. The primary authority systems that
will be considered in this paper are the bureaucratic, collegial, and
shared governance (a system peculiar to higher education). The professional, guild or union, political, and individual or personal will also be
discussed where interview comments warrant such considerations.

The next chapter will review the literature on the evaluation of
research and on tenure and promotion in higher education. Following
this discussion, Chapter III will explain and outline the methodology
used in the conduct of the research and interviews. Chapter IV is divided
into two sections: the first section provides a brief discussion of the promotion and tenure guidelines as found in faculty handbooks; the second
section discusses and analyzes the interviews. Chapter V presents the
conclusions derived from the analysis of the interviewees’ coments and
suggests further research.

Chapter II: Literature Review

15

Chapter II

Review of the Literature
The literature concerning evaluation of research was at its height during
the 1960s and 70s, tapered off in the 80s and largely disappeared by the
mid-80s. Published primarily in journals of psychology, economics, finance, and sociology, most of this research has been quantitative, measuring professional output in different disciplines and universities and
comparing faculty in different disciplines and universities. Many of these
publications also centered on how the three primary evaluative criteria
(publications, citations and peer reviews) compare to each other in reliability and “successful” evaluation of faculty. [See Table 1.]
Most authors devoted their attention to the sciences and social
sciences, largely ignoring the humanities. As we can see from Table 2,
the majority of the literature has examined some aspect of the productivity and evaluation of faculty in the hard sciences (chemistry, physics,
biomedical basic sciences such as biochemistry and physiology), with
examination of the social sciences (especially sociology, economics and
finance) a close second.
It is perhaps instructive to note that the preponderance of these
studies has concentrated on a particular “measure” of productivity—or
they have attempted to contrast and compare the different measures
(citations, publications, journals, awards and honors, student publication rates, peer prestige). In general, these are easily measured or
counted factors. Table 1 shows the measures the researchers have studied in the past 30 years. Most have considered publications to be the
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Table 1: “Measures” Considered in the Literature
pubs

Anderson/Narin/McAllister
Arreola
Blume/Sinclair
Biglan
Blackburn/clark
Beyer/Stevens
Box/Cotgrove
Brooks
Buffardi/Nichols
Crane (1965)
Cole/Cole (1967)
Creswell/Bean
Clark
Cole/Cole(1971)
Cole/Cole (1981)
Crane (1967)
Elton/Rose
Fulton/Trow
Fox
Ferber
Gaston
Gottfredson
Gunn
Gaston/lantz/Snyder
Gray
Hancock
Hickson/Stacks/Amsbary
Jauch/Glueck
Katz
King/Wolfe
Kroc
Laband (1986)
Laband/Sophocleus
Long/McGinnis
Levin/Stephan
Laband
Lodahl/Gordon
Long/Allison/McGinnis
Lehman
Lightfield
Manis
Margolis
Meltzer/Salter
Meltzer
Morgan/Meier
Muffo/Mead/Bayer
Roskens
Rotton

x

citation

x

peer/

eval/

prestige

salary

formula

general/
other

x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x

x
x
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Table 1 (continued)
pubs

Roche/Smith
Ruston/Roediger
Smart/McLaughlin
Smith/Fiedler
Saaty
Stigler/Friedland
Tollison/Goff
Tuckman/Hagemann
White/White
Whitman/Weiss
Zivney/Bertin
Zamarippa
Zuckerman

x

citation

x
x

peer/

eval/

salary

prestige

formula

general/
other

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Table 2: Studies Categorized by Discipline
Hard Science

Social Sciences

Humanities

Anderson et al. (1978)

Beyer and Stevens* (1977)

King and Wolfe* (1987)

Beyer and Stevens* (1977)

Cartter (1977)

Larson (1993)

Blume and Sinclair (1973)

Gilley (1986)

Muffo* (1987)

Cole and Cole (1971)

Gottfredson (1978)

Roche and Smith* (1978)

Crane (1965, 1967)

Hickson et al. (1992)

Rotton* (1990)

Cropley and Field (1969)

Laband (1986a, 1986b)

Smart and McLaughlin*

Gaston (1970)

Lightfield (1971)

Jauch and Glueck (1975)

Lodahl and Beyer

Smith and Fiedler* (1971)

Jones and Froom (1994)

Lodahl and Gordon (1973)

Smart and Elton* (1975)

Levin and Stephan (1991)

Tuckman and Hagemann (1976)

Long and McGinnis (1981)

King and Wolfe* (1987)

Long et al. (1979)

Kroc (1984)

Margolis (1967)

Morgan (1981)

Meltzer and Salter (1962)

Muffo* (1987)

Meltzer (1956, 1962)

Ruston and Roediger (1978)

Merton (1968)

Roche and Smith* (1978)

Muffo* (1987)

Rotton* (1990)

Parmerter and Garber (1971)

Smart and McLaughlin* (1978)

Roche and Smith* (1978)

Smith and Fiedler* (1971)

Rotton* (1990)

Smart and Elton* (1975)

Smart and McLaughlin* (1978) Stigler and Friedland (1975)
Smart and Elton* (1975)

Tollison and Goff* (1986)

Smith and Fiedler* (1971)

White and White (1977)

Tollison and Goff* (1986)

Zivne;y and Bertin (1992)

Zamarripa (1995, 1993)
Zuckerman (1970, 1971)
*appears in more than one column

(1978)
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most important factor. But citation rates and peer or salary prestige
measures have both come in for their share of concern. Cartter [1977]
ranked the top ten schools in business, law and education on the basis
of faculty ratings. Some authors singled out one discipline for study
(such as economics, or physics, or even in one case a study of “productive women” in communication studies). The striking facet of all these
studies, however, is the attempt to measure in some way. This effort thus
becomes quantitative, which intuitively runs contrary to the idea that
“worth” and “quality” are qualitative features that defy totally objective
numeric measurement.
Only four of the studies in the literature discussed the desirability
of establishing a formula whereby “research productivity” can be numerically calculated. These four studies, however, do not question the validity
of a mathematical formula for evaluation—they are proponents of such a
scheme. Arreola [1979] states that each faculty member decides what
criteria he or she will be evaluated on and the percentage weight applied
to each role; he then suggests a method of turning these ratings into an
algorithm for mathematically computing raises. Saaty [1983] developed a
mathematical technique, called analytic hierarchy process, for comparing
faculty. This method is a pairwise, stepped, hierarchical process that
“can reduce qualitative comparisons to numeric indices.” Brooks [1980]
echoes the others in suggesting that the ultimate goal is to get values out
front and have a consistent method of arriving at rewards and shaping
collective goals. Gunn [1982] goes one step further and says that faculty
should evaluate their superiors. His system includes peer evaluation,
self-assessment, administrative appraisal, arbitration and a yearly mo-
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rale survey (he does not say whether this morale survey should be
anonymous)!
Unfortunately, none of these studies have attempted to examine
the relationships between department and institution with respect to
structure, goals and operation. Lodahl and Gordon [1972] explored differences among disciplines using Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm, thus
prefiguring Anthony Biglan’s work on characteristics of disciplines.
In his study of disciplinary differences at a large midwestern university and a small northwestern college, Biglan [1973A] examined the
structure, goals and operations of the various disciplines but touched in
only a cursory fashion the relationships to those same factors at the level
of the enterprise. By examining what are most “important” characteristics and how each discipline perceived or thought of itself, he derived an
eight-cell classification of 35 disciplines based on whether the field is
hard or soft, life or nonlife and then further subdivided those four classifications into pure and applied. A few limited studies [Roskens, 1983;
Smart and Elton, 1975; Smart and McLaughlin, 1978)] at other institutions strongly supported Biglan’s model at both functional and philosophical levels.
Biglan’s two seminal studies concentrated on deriving disciplinary
characteristics (beginning with the assumption that two primary dimensions are at work—whether a discipline is paradigmatic or not and
whether the discipline is concerned with practical application or not). He
paid no attention to how those characteristics might influence or be
influenced by the institution in which they existed. Let us note that his
study involved faculty at a large state institution and a small liberal arts
college [Biglan, 1973A]. He also assumed that disciplinary specialization
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is essentially the same as a departmental unit in the institution, an
assumption that today we might hold invalid: an English department
may have specialists in Victorian literature, the eighteenth century novel,
Romantic poetry, medieval literature; a mathematics department may
have specialists in topology, differential equations, number theory,
analysis, graph theory; a history department may have faculty who specialize in American history, local history, medieval history, European
history; a biochemistry department can have specialists in DNA repair,
genetics, immune systems (and a separate department of immunology
could also exist), cellular function (which could also belong to the
anatomy or toxicology department).
Biglan’s paper on subject matter characteristics and structure
[1973B] examined disciplinary differences with respect to commitment to
teaching, research, administration and service in terms of “liking” and
the amount of time spent on these activities, along with some other factors [Biglan, 1973B]. He did not look at promotion and tenure, nor did he
examine any relationships to the enterprise itself. Zuckerman’s 1970
paper on internal stratification of scientific fields is the only paper that
comes close to examining this facet of disciplinary organization. She
considers how certain factors can, but do not necessarily, lead to success
(meaning honors, awards, grants, recognition by peers, citations). She
also commented that “expensive science is not necessarily good science”
and said that scientists accept the prevailing system and take the prevailing criteria for evaluation as correct.
In his 1981 book, Burton R. Clark noted that work in a “knowledge-bearing system . . . [reduced] to its primordial elements” has two
basic divisions: the discipline and the enterprise (institution, in a geo-
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graphic sense), specialty and geography. [Clark, p.28] Departmental
organization brings the two together and strengthens both even though
specialization affects the coherence of the enterprise and tends to fragment it rather than unify it. [Clark, p. 36] Thus, “analysis and policy
need to take seriously the ways in which universities and colleges are
internally differentiated around knowledge.” Note that, even at the height
of research into various aspects of research and its evaluation, Clark
found only two studies that attempted to study these “primordial relationships”: Judith Adkinson (1979) and Anthony Biglan, whose work I
have already discussed. It is Clark’s work that informs the research
questions for this study.
One paper (Lincoln, 1983) examined the structure of promotion
and tenure decisions, suggesting that the two are different types of decisions, have different goals, and should therefore be made by different
groups of people within the institution. Promotion decisions, she suggests, are based on merit and are properly made by peers in the department; tenure decisions, on the other hand, are based on “value,” affect
the institution, and should be made by administrators who are not in the
department.
Pittman and Slate [1989] echoed some of Lincoln’s concerns,
noting that any effective evaluation system must have a solid conceptual
base that results from answering basic questions such as the goals of the
evaluation and the areas to be evaluated. They recommended using the
university mission statement to create specific evaluation goals and
construct a skeletal process. [They did not make it clear how they would
construct this process from the institution’s mission statement.] The
authors said that elementary questions of the purpose and limits of
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evaluation and areas of faculty responsibility must underlie faculty
evaluation systems and that having a set of defined values at the core
of the process can minimize conflicts. Although the authors discussed
the entire faculty evaluation process without specific emphasis on research evaluation, they did tie the discipline or department to the institution—by tying the goals and process of the evaluation to the mission
statement.
Two studies by Leo Meltzer (1956 and 1962) tied performance and
productivity to organizational structure—specifically in terms of supervision or freedom and funding. These papers are concerned with industrial
or corporate research, however, and may not have direct application to
higher education. The earlier paper showed a clear relationship of funding and freedom from direct supervision to publications, although
Meltzer and his co-author were subsequently unable to demonstrate any
relationship of research productivity to organization size or effectiveness.
They noted, however, that all relationships were of “trivial magnitude”
[Meltzer, 1962].
Prodgers (1980) dealt with the topic of standardizing faculty evaluation. Although he was primarily concerned with teaching and the use
and development of student evaluation forms, he did say that faculty
must be heavily involved in developing evaluative criteria and processes
and that administrative support for systematic change is essential for its
success.
A number of researchers compared various measures of “productivity,“ “efficiency,” and “reputation.” Productivity for most means papers
published—normatively in peer-reviewed journals. This criterion in most
studies correlated well with other measures such as awards, citations,
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grant funds (in engineering, biomedical fields, and the hard sciences),
and number of PhDs produced. However, results are not consistent, and
in one notable study, Roche and Smith [1978] found moderate correlation between citation rankings and peer and productivity rankings. In a
study of reputation and productivity in public administration and public
affairs programs, the authors [Morgan and Meier, 1974] found only a fair
(70 percent) correlation; but more importantly, they found that those in a
region tended to rank schools in that region higher. Although correlations in all measures were generally fair to good, even if not highly statistically significant, several authors [notably Smith and Fiedler, 1971]
discussed the problems inherent in each and recommended that no one
measure be used in isolation.
Since publication is universally considered one measure of productivity, success, research prowess, creativity and scholarship, one paper
by Zuckerman and Merton [1971] manages to cover the topic thoroughly
from an historic perspective. The authors also examined rejection rates
and concluded that, since rejection rates are much higher in the humanities, they reflect the state of consensus in the discipline—namely,
that there is little consensus. Also, notably, they found that referees [of
one physics journal] showed no preferential pattern of rejection and
acceptance of papers submitted by authors with different reputational
rankings, which would seem to indicate that concern for the advancement of the discipline is of paramount importance.
A limited volume of literature is available that deals explicitly with
tenure and promotion per se—the structures and processes associated
with the decision to promote or not to promote. Creswell examined the
criteria used for evaluating faculty for promotion and tenure, noting in
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particular that institutional attitudes are especially important as universities seek “world class” faculty. He did note that different institutions
approach research and scholarship differently. He also discussed evaluating research performance and reviewing that performance at different
levels and indicated the importance of considering “the process for order ing importance and the criteria on which to base the ordering,” [Creswell,
1986, p. 95].
Seldin has produced two volumes dealing with the evaluation of
research, but he looked at criteria rather than the relationships that
exist between department and enterprise. Seldin was more interested in
the tools than in the underlying culture and philosophies and did not
deal with the relationships between institution and discipline.
Centra [1977] also examined the evaluation of faculty research
performance, but again more from the perspective of tools, specific criteria, changing trends in the use of certain information and, in some small
sense, disciplinary differences. This is the one study that discussed how
the evaluation of research depends on the “the type of department and
the level of the institution” [Centra, p. 1].
We see from the above discussion that the literature dealing with
issues and the conceptual basis of promotion and tenure is seriously
limited. The literature dealing with the relationship of the discipline and
department to the encompassing institution in faculty evaluation issues
is equally limited. Whereas, as we have already seen, many researchers
have conducted studies on the particulars of various evaluation criteria
and their relative merits, few have devoted attention to the influence of
the institution on the department (or the influence of the department on
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the institution) with respect to the goals, structure and operation of the
evaluation of research.
Burton R. Clark’s 1983 book, The Higher Education System, calls
attention to this gap in the research about higher education. He noted
that most writers have concentrated on enterprises and their students,
although others have focused on disciplines, the academic profession,
the “academic man,” and some “small effort has been made to study the
national academic associations . . .” [Clark, p. 32]. He said further that
“analysis and policy need to take seriously the ways in which universities
and colleges are internally differentiated around knowledge” [Clark, p.
41]. Although Biglan studied disciplinary differences, Clark evidently is
of the opinion that those studies are not taken seriously enough. He also
discussed the six “legitimate” authority structures found in higher education (the personal, collegial, guild, and professional being “rooted in
the discipline,” and the trustee and institutional bureaucracy “belonging
to the enterprise.” Where do these authority structures meet and how?
David D. Dill [1986] picked up these threads and examined the
effects of culture and context on research performance. He noted that
three main processes are at work: (1) recruitment —selecting those with
a proven commitment to research; (2) communication—support of colleagues within and without the local enterprise; and (3) leadership and
structure—leaders and administrators must have values and knowledge
and a “competence and commitment to research” in places where research performance is expected.
Daniel Alpert, also in 1986, used Clark’s matrix concept to reexamine the university and department relationship at a structural level.
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He noted that faculty often have closer relationships with colleagues in
their own fields at other universities than with members of other units on
their local campus. He also commented that, where interdisciplinary
efforts are involved, the university depends on individual faculty “rather
than organizational structure or administrative leadership” [Alpert, p.
90]. He clearly had difficulty placing what he called “interdisciplinary
mission organizations” into the matrix model. Alpert also remarked that
the evaluation of research, as it is done today, imposes a conformity of
values and calls for “new maps of the future university” [Alpert, p. 99].
He suggested that this new map might be a construct of “informal networks” that transcend the governance structure of the institution and
the disciplinary or professional communities.
The research reported in the next chapters will attempt to develop
some insight into these issues and concepts. In particular, I hope to
show how the enterprise and the discipline interact and, in so doing,
develop some insights on enhancing the research culture at self-styled
research universities.
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Chapter III

Methodology
This study is a two-part project which began in the fall of 1995 with a
content analysis of the promotion and tenure sections of faculty handbooks from 31 state, land-grant institutions. This analysis reveals that
state land-grant universities could be reasonably divided into three governance groups according to how committees and administrators are
involved in promotion and tenure decisions. These categories are the
bureaucratic, shared governance, and collegial authority structures as
defined in Chapter I. This content analysis was used to derive the prospective interviewee enterprises, selecting one as representative of each
type of authority structure.
The second part of the study involved interviews with the chair and
chair of the personnel or promotion and tenure committee in each of four
departments at each of the three selected enterprises. These departments
represent four of Biglan’s eight disciplinary categories (omitting the four
life-nonlife categories). A table of departments to be interviewed was
developed according to Biglan’s typology: English (basic, soft), psychology

Table 3: Biglan’s Disciplinary Categories—An Example
Hard
Life
Basic
Applied

Soft
Nonlife

Life

Nonlife

Biology

Chemistry

Sociology

English

Plant Science

Engineering

Education

Economics
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(applied, soft), mechanical engineering (applied, hard) and chemistry
(basic, hard). Table 3 illustrates these categories.
The top administrator charged with the oversight of faculty personnel matters and the top academic administrator (chancellor, provost or
vice president) were also interviewed. A set of six to eight questions was
developed for each category of person to be interviewed—chair, committee chair or upper administration. The chosen universities were then
contacted by an initial letter to the chief academic officer, asking permission to interview on that campus.
Beginning in the fall of 1996, I sent e-mail or made telephone calls
to set up appointment times for telephone interviews and, over a period
of almost a year, interviewed four department chairs, two P&T committee
chairs, the associate provost and provost at the bureaucratic university
(which we shall call Bureaucratic University); four department chairs,
one P&T committee chair and the provost and associate provost and the
shared governance university (here called Shared-Governance University
or S-G U.); and finally three chairs, the associate provost and the chair of
the university personnel committee at the collegial university (called
Collegial University). P&T committee chairs as a group were not available
because of a policy of confidentiality at Collegial U. Table 4 shows the
respondents from each enterprise.
The questions were slightly different depending on the position of
the person being interviewed (see Appendix A). As usual with open-ended
questions and interviews of this nature, some respondents answered
fully but did not precisely direct their answers to the question. Some
tried responding with one-word answers. Some went into lengthy explanations that were not particularly germane. One noticeable tendency was
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Interviews Conducted
Institution

Department/
Position

Bureaucratic U

S-G U

Collegial U

Chair

X

X

X

P&T Committee

X

–

–

Chair

X

X

0

P&T Committee

–

0

–

Chair

X

X

X

P&T committee

–

–

–

Chair

X

X

X

P&T Committee

X

X

–

Chief Academic Officer*

X

X

0

Associate Provost

X

X

X

English

Chemistry

Psychology

Engineering

University Committee

X

*The position includes the following titles: provost, chancellor, vice chancellor,
chief academic officer, and vice president. I have used here the term I found
most common among all institutions originally surveyed.
X
–
0

interviewed
no such position in this department or no incumbent at this time
failed contact or incumbent declined to be interviewed
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Table 5: Relationships to Be Investigated
Discipline
Institution

Structure

Goals

Operations

Structure

1

2

3

Goals

4

5

6

Operation

7

8

9

the desire to discuss teaching and its evaluation instead of a perceived
relationship (or lack of one) of research to teaching and their relative
weight in the promotion and tenure process. A question to ask in a future study might try to tease out whether this tendency is a result of
solid concerns about the function of the academy or a result of “student
centered” attitudes and articles critical of the quality of undergraduate
instruction in research universities as well as critical of the research
itself. Is there a solid appreciation of the fact that the academy, to exist
at all, must have both students and professors? And there probably is
not an appreciation that faculty-student conflict is as old as the concept
of a university [see Morison, Three Centuries...].
Following the guidelines of the Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects, each respondent was assured that his or
her answers would be strictly confidential and that there would be no
identifiers or any other way for either them or their institution to be
identified. Each interview was taped and transcribed, except for one
interview for which the tape did not function properly so that handwritten notes had to be relied on.
After each interview was transcribed, it was coded using the
method recommended in Berg [1989]. Each coded interview was then cut
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according to the coding phrases and taped onto 3 x 5 cards (see Appendix B for a complete list of the terms, not all of which proved germane to
this study). After an initial arrangement of cards into sections, some
topics were collapsed to yield the final groupings used (see Appendix C)
and some were eliminated. This part of the research was completed in
the early spring of 1998.
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Chapter IV

Discussion and Analysis
Preliminary Statistical Analysis
Prior to beginning any analysis of faculty handbooks, data was collected
on all state, land-grant universities with Carnegie classifications of Research I or Research II. With the assistance of Magdalena Bugaj, we
attempted to determine if there was any relationship between demographic information about the institution (such as the geographic region,
size of surrounding community, size of student body, ratio of faculty to
students, books in library, external funding, ratio of graduate to undergraduate students and the number of upper administrators) and its
formal authority structure as deduced from the content analysis of faculty handbooks. There was no correlation. Admitting that the total
sample size of 31 is very small (and only 25 for Research I universities),
we were unable to find any relationship. Then we analyzed these same
factors with respect to whether the institution is bureaucratic, sharedgovernance or collegial according to a content analysis of faculty handbooks (see below). Again there was no correlation. Even after adjusting
for the extremely small cell size (there are only three universities that can
be classified in the collegial category and four in the bureaucratic category). See Appendix E for selected tables.
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Graphic Representation of Analysis of Faculty Handbooks
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Faculty Handbooks
Every university has some statement about promotion and tenure policies and criteria in its faculty handbook. A content analysis of these
documents formed the first phase of this study. But before commencing
a discussion and analysis of the interviews with departmental and institutional personnel, we should briefly examine the guidelines and criteria
for promotion and tenure provided in the handbooks of the three enterprises under consideration here.
Bureaucratic U
The faculty handbook at Bureaucratic U indicates that chairs and
deans make recommendations on promotion and tenure to the university
level official. But at the same time, elements of the shared-governance
structure are clearly evident in that all major decisions on structure,
procedure and specific criteria for the promotion and tenure process are
the purview of the department or unit.
Although “each academic unit is charged to establish procedures
so that its faculty can provide advice to the academic administrator regarding recommendations for various academic personnel actions,” the
enterprise has developed “a comprehensive form” for reporting various
activities and accomplishments of the candidate. Institutional guidelines
do not specify a structure, process or criteria for promotion or tenure,
stating simply that “faculty members have a responsibility to conduct
research and engage in creative activity in their area(s) or appointment
and professional competence.”
Dossiers are reviewed in the department, and “each academic unit
is charged to establish procedures so that its faculty can provide advice
to the academic administrator regarding recommendations for various
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academic personnel actions.” Each department is required to have “procedures and criteria that are clearly formulated and relevant on which to
evaluate the performance of faculty members.” Additionally, chairs are
“responsible as an individual for the recommendations made.”
Deans review departmental recommendations and may, but are not
required to, establish an advisory committee for promotion and tenure
actions. Of particular interest is the statement that external peer reviews
are encouraged but not required.
The office of the provost reviews all recommendations for promotion
and tenure “primarily in terms of the evidence for the effectiveness of
each individual in the performance of academic duties.” The provost
considers the following factors (quoted from the faculty handbook):
* “In each case, solid evidence of consistent and persistent professional improvement and effectiveness . . . sufficient to serve as a basis for
predicting continued professional effectiveness and growth for the remainder of the individual’s academic career.
* Evidence of actual and/or potential external competition for
employment in the Big Ten or institutions of at least comparable quality.
* The history of salary increases awarded the individual relative to
others in the unit.
* Evidence of having met the standards of the college and department/school for recommendation of appointment, reappointment, award
of tenure, and promotion.”
The provost will also consider “progress of the unit toward achievng
and maintaining diversity and recognition of diversity in the unit’s definition of quality.”
Shared-Governance U
Shared-Governance U had, at the time of these interviews, just
revised its promotion and tenure guidelines. The striking difference between the old guidelines and the new ones are the absence of any men-
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tion of unit guidelines that may supplement those of the enterprise. The
following are statements from the 1995 promotion and tenure guidelines:
* “Candidates for promotion and tenure will be evaluated objectively for evidence of excellence in the performance of assigned duties, in
their scholarship or creative activity, and in their professional service.
* “The responsibilities of individual faculty in relation to these
fundamental commitments will vary and will be specified in position
descriptions developed at the time of initial appointment and revised
periodcally, as necessary.
* “. . . [A]ll faculty are expected to be collegial members of their
units . . .
* “Scholarship and creative activity are understood to be intellectual work whose significance is validated by peers and which is communicated. . . . [S]uch work in its diverse forms is based on a high level of
professional expertise; must give evidence of originality; must be documented and validated as through peer review or critique; and must be
communicated in appropriate ways so as to have impact on or significance for publics beyond the University, or for the discipline itself.”
The guidelines state that faculty involved in joint efforts should
clarify their role in that effort and also that the successful application for
grants is evidence of “achievement in scholarship.”
The new guidelines document outlines procedural guidelines,
which include the statement that “the process for earning promotion and
tenure begins at the moment of hiring.” The candidate’s supervisor and
“a promotion and tenure review committee formed from among the tenured faculty within the unit (at or above the rank for which the candidate
is being considered) will independently evaluate the materials in the
dossier, and will recommend either for or against the candidate’s promotion or tenure.” Of particular interest may be the state board of higher
education requirement that “students will be invited to participate in the
review of faculty for promotion and tenure” in matters related to teaching. The next step is the college review, the procedures for which are
established in each college. “A letter of evaluation from the dean, and
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from the review committee in colleges where one is established for this
purpose, are added to the dossier as it is forwarded for review at the
University level.” At the university level, the Associate Provost for Academic Affairs reviews each dossier, who may confer with others. Dossiers
with mixed reviews will be reviewed by “the University Administrative
Promotion and Tenure Committee, which is chaired by the Provost and
Executive Vice President and consists of the Associate Provost for Academic Affairs, the Vice Provost for Research and International Programs,
the Dean of Extended Education, and the Dean of the Graduate School
. . . . The purpose of the University review is to ensure that all faculty are
held to common standards, and to resolve disagreements in previous
recommendations.”
Thus, we see that a promotion and tenure committee is required at
the unit or departmental level, although its structure is not specified.
The dean reviews the dossier with the advice of a college promotion and
tenure committee. The university level committee, surprisingly, is made
up entirely of individuals holding administrative positions. The primary
requirements for promotion and tenure are the “communication and
validation” of scholarly or creative work, meeting the job expectations
outlined in the position description, and collegiality.

Collegial U
At Collegial U, the faculty handbook defines titles and includes
numerous policies concerned with tenure and promotion, but few are
germaine to this study. The handbook says only that review committees
are responsible for maintaining the “quality of the faculty of [Collegial U]”
by ascertaining “the present fitness of each candidate and the likelihood
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of the candidate’s pursuing a productive career.” Of particular note, this
paragraph on the responsibilities of the review committees says that “it is
appropriate to consider professional integrity as evidenced by performance of duties.” These review committees are nominees of the institutional personnel committee and make their reports to that body which,
by policy, is composed of faculty and is responsible for “making an unequivocal recommendation.” Thus, the committees discussed in this
document are subcommittees of the university-level committee and not
departmental or college committees.
The faculty handbook leaves the structure and procedures at the
department level entirely up to the department, requiring only that the
chair’s recommendation include documentation of the department’s
assessment of a candidate. Supporting documentation for the institutional review committees comes from the department chair whose comments should include “comprehensive assessment of the candidate’s
qualifications together with detailed evidence to support this evaluation.”
This letter also should include a “report of the department chair’s consultation with the members of the department.” The chair normally also
provides complete biographies, bibliographies, and opinions from colleagues. “Extramural opinions are imperative in cases of proposed appointments to tenure status of persons from outside the university.”
Opinions of external peers thus seem not to be essential in any other
case of promotion or tenure.
There is no mention of departmental committees—only that the
chair has consulted with departmental faculty. Neither is there mention
of the involvement of the dean or college committee in the process. However, in a flow chart appended to documentation received from the insti-
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tutional review committee, the documentation flow, which appears in
Appendix D, includes the dean and college level review committee. Since
this flow chart is not indicated in the faculty handbook, which is a policy
document for all campuses of the university system, we can only conclude that the document flow chart is an enterprise-level procedure. This
committee has also provided a guide for the “advancement and promotion of junior faculty” that serves as a supplement to the faculty handbook.
The handbook of Collegial U, like the others, seeks to maintain the
high quality of its faculty. However, it includes some statements (such as
the one we have already seen on professional ethics) that are not found
in the handbooks of the other institutions in this study:
(1)
“Account should be taken of the type and quality of creative
activity normally expected in the candidate’s field.
(2)
Due consideration should be given to variations among fields
and specialities and to new genres and fields of inquiry.
(3)
Textbooks, reports, circulars, and similar publications normally are considered evidence of teaching ability or public service.
(4)
. . .contributions by faculty members to the professional
literature or to the advancement of professional practice or professional
education should be judged creative work when they present new ideas
or original scholarly research.”

Mission Statements
Bureaucratic U
“. . . holds a unique position in the state’s educational system. As a
respected research and teaching university, it is committed to intellectual leadership and to excellence in both developing new knowledge and
conveying that knowledge to its students and to the public. And as a
pioneer land-grant institution, . . . strives to discover practical uses for
theoretical knowledge and to speed the diffusion of information to residents of the state, the nation, and the world. In fostering both research
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and its application, this university will continue to be a catalyst for positive intellectual, social, and technological change.
“At . . . excellence is a continuing tradition. . . . is a research intensive, land-grant university where people matter. The University is dedicated to educating tomorrow’s leaders and scholars. Innovative and
hard-working, . . . creates knowledge and extends learning to actively
serve [the state], the nation, and the international community.”
In addition, the university promulgates five goal statements:
* Academically outstanding, nationally and globally; preparing
tomorrow’s scholars and leaders
* A vital resource in creating and applying knowledge to help
address the critical problems of the 21st century; improving
economic competitivenss and the quality of life for [the state],
the nation, and the world
* A university preferred by students who are diverse, talented,
and eager to learn
* One of the most effectively administered, people-oriented
institutions in the United States
* Coherent and focused on strengths that create a distinctive
and enduring character to assure [the university’s] future
To attain these goals, the university has developed a set of “guiding
principles”:
*
*
*
*
*
*

Improve access to quality education and expert knowledge
Achieve more active learning
Generate new knowledge and scholarship across the mission
Promote problem solving to address society’s needs
Advance diversity within community
Make people matter

Shared-Governance U
“. . . serves the people of . . ., the nation and the world through
education, research, and service.”
“ . . . extends its programs throughout the world, and is committed
to providing access and educational opportunities to minorities and to
disabled and disadvantaged persons.
“. . . has an inherent commitment to provide a comprehensive
array of high-quality educational programs in the sciences, liberal arts,
and selected professions. The University encourages students, both on
and off campus, to develop an enriched awareness of themselves and
their global environment.
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“Through research, . . . extends the frontiers of knowledge in the
sciences, liberal arts, and in all aspects of natural, human, and economic
resources. . . . contributes to the intellectual development and the economic and technological advancement of humankind.
“As a Land Grant and Sea Grant University, . . . has a special
responsibility for education and research enabling the people of . . . and
the world to develop and utilize human, land, atmospheric, and oceanic
resources. Unique programs of public service throughout [the state]
supplement campus-based University teaching and research.”

Collegial U
In 1996 Collegial U revamped its mission statement into a “pledge,”
which reads as follows:
“The [Collegial U] Pledge is designed to fulfill the university’s
historic promise to maintain diversity while preserving excellence
and to provide the best education to all of the state’s diverse
student populations particularly those whose opportunities
are limited because they are financially or educationally
disadvantaged.
The [Collegial U] Pledge has five goals:
1. to help strengthen the K-12 schools
2. to enhance campus recruitment efforts through a new campus
Recruitment Corps
3. to keep [Collegial U] affordable for all students
4. to enhance campus academic support services for . . .
undergraduate and graduate students and,
5. to provide an environment that encourages promising under graduates to pursue graduate and professional studies.”

The enterprise has “pledged one million dollars to realize these goals. In
December 1996, two other projects were incorporated into the pledge: the
[Collegial U] Academy and the Pledge Volunteer Corps.” Expanding on
the five points, the enterprise continues its advertising by explaining
“The [Collegial U] Pledge, launched in 1996, is a program committed to sustaining campus diversity by providing equal opportunity and
access to all, particularly those students most disadvantaged and
underrepresented in higher education in [the state]. The Pledge has five
key components:
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to strengthen [[Collegial U]’s] partnership with K-12 schools,
and attempt a new outreach model that can be replicated in
the state and nation
to enhance [Collegial U’s] statewide recruitment activities to
attract top performing students, especially those from
disadvantaged populations
to increase scholarship support and employment opportunities
so that financial barriers do not prevent students from
attending [Collegial U]
to strengthen campus academic support services to sustain
high retention and graduation rates
to encourage undergraduates to pursue graduate study and
professional careers”

Discussion and Analysis of Interviews
The respondents in this study ran the gamut from reticent and essentially uncooperative to overly talkative. The interviews provided some
valuable insights to instruct future studies of the relationship between
departmental and institutional promotion and tenure objectives, operation, and structure.
General themes of the interviews include
* Concern with “quality,” “high standards” and “status” (goals)
* Looking to the institution for criteria referencing but to the
discipline outside the institution for judgment of the quality of
scholarship to attain goals (operation).
* The subjectivity inherent in the process of judging another
faculty member’s work, leading to committees to gather
information or to evaluate the candidate or both (structure).
Of particular note is the evidence that structure and operation at
the departmental level appear to have no essential relationship to the
structure and operations of either the institution or the discipline in
either the bureaucratic or shared governance institution. In other words,
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each department appears to have arrived at its functional process and
departmental structure in a totally random fashion without reference to
the enterprise that houses it or to the discipline that informs its basic
standards of research endeavor.

Structure
Every department in the study, and probably every formally constituted
department at any institution of higher educaton, has some variety of a
committee or group that either reviews or is charged with collecting the
credentials of candidates for tenure or promotion. In some cases it is an
ad hoc, informally constituted group that collects information for presentation to the department as a whole, to some subset of the department,
to the chair, to the dean or to the university; yet other units have a formally elected or appointed committee or subcommittee that reviews
(rather than just collects) the candidate’s credentials; some elected
committees perform as the ad hoc groups and just collect information.
Table 6 provides a preliminary overview of the structure of departmental promotion and tenure committees. This table, even with the little
detail possible in such a graphic, shows immediately that structures are
quite dissimilar both within the enterprise and across the discipline. Two
departments at Shared-Governance U appear to be constructed alike,
and all departments at Collegial U appear to be alike, although from the
preceding discussion, we know that there are substantive differences. It
appears, then, that the authority structure at the enterprise level—bureaucracy, collegium, or shared governance—has little or no discernible
bearing on the structure obtained at the department level in the promo-
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tion and tenure process. The departmental promotion and tenure structure will be discussed in greater detail in the following pages. We will see
that no pattern exists either within the enterprise or within the discipline
at the national level.

Table 6: Departmental Promotion and Tenure Committees
at Three Universities
Bureaucratic U
E M P C
ad hoc com.

x

subset of dept. votes

x

entire dept. votes

x

elected com.

x

x

Collegial U
E M P C

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x1 x

x

x

x

x

x
x

appointed com.

x
x

subcommittee

x

x

recommends to chair

x

x

E = English (soft, pure)
P = Psychology (soft, applied)

Shared-Gov. U
E M P C

x2

x
x

x

x

x

x

M = Mechanical Engineering (hard, applied)
C = Chemistry (hard, pure)

1

Only the committee chair is elected; he then appoints the committee.

2

One member appointed by the chair of the department

At Bureaucratic U, we find a variety of structures for dealing with
promotion and tenure. In engineering, the promotion and tenure committee is departmentally elected, reviews the candidates, writes a report, and
passes the “advisory recommendation” on to the department chair. This
is much like the English department at Shared-Governance U—except
for the fact that the P&T committee “will take each person to be reviewed
carefully and form a three-person subcommittee.” These subcommittees
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“must have representation from the promotion committee” —in fact, two
members of the subcommittee are from the promotion committee. Additionally, the candidate has the right to replace one member of the subcommittee with a person of his or her choosing. Let us note the fact that
the chair said “each person to be reviewed carefully”—we will return to
that phrase later. Again, although the P&T committee is elected by the
department as a whole, it forwards its report to the chair without further
discussion with the department.
The chemistry department at Bureaucratic U presents yet another
structure. Here the P&T committee is yearly nominated by faculty in
each of the primary subfields of chemistry, with a fifth appointed by the
department chair to serve as P&T committee chair. Once constituted, the
P&T committee then polls every faculty member “as to whether they
would like to be considered for promotion. That makes contact at the
outset between the committee and the person involved and sometimes
provides an opportunity for feedback to the individual.” The committee
does its evaluation and writes a report, which it presents to the entire
department in a “full faculty meeting.” “There is discussion amongst the
faculty, and the faculty then votes on whether to accept or deny the
recommendation of the P&T committee.” As the chair said in explanation
of this procedure, “A tenure decision I think is regarded in our department as the most important decision that a department makes.” This
idea found support in his statement “that if a vote is, say, 60 percent in
favor and 40 percent against, it is unlikely that that person is going to
get tenure.” Evidently this department wants strong consensus to award
tenure and is similarly concerned with promotion issues.
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As with other departments and other universities, only faculty at
or above the rank to which the candidate seeks participate in the evaluation. But unlike some other units, minority and gender representation on
the committee are not a concern. However, the chair commented that
“The area we try to balance gender roles is in search committees for
hiring, but there is no special consideration at the tenure and promotion
level.”
Communication at each level and at each stage of the process
appear to be important in this chemistry department, especially as the
chair noted that “[a]t the conclusion of the process, I always sit down
with the person involved and review the report of the [P&T] committee
and also give my own views on the progress the person is making.” This
statement suggests that the chemistry department is using yearly reviews in a constructive manner to help faculty realize their potential and
receive the promotions they want.
The psychology department also involves the department in the
promotion and tenure decisions, although only those with rank at or
above the candidate vote on that candidate. In this department, rather
than having a duly appointed or elected P&T committee, each person up
for either action has a “review committee” to help them gather the necessary materials. “That tends to be three or four people. It’s four people if
there’s a critical decision required such as a promotion to associate with
tenure or promotion to full.”
It is this review committee that appears to be the site of departmental contention at times. This is an “information gathering” group.
But, the chair noted that “A problem we’ve had over the years—and I
don’t know if it is a problem, perhaps most departments have it—is to
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what extent should that be an evaluative committee or to what extent
they should be fact finding, and we go back and forth, frankly. Sometimes they get to the end. . . and become advocates to the point that the
rest of the faculty gets a little irritated because they don’t think they are
getting the really accurate information. And so we go back and forth a
little bit. . ..If we have conflict, it tends to be in the process that we use.
We seem to want to. . .we get tired of a process, and then we want to
change it a little bit each year.”
Turning to the English department at Bureaucratic U, we find a
structure similar to the one in engineering. In English, a “three- or sometimes four-person committee [is] appointed to look specifically at his or
her work [the candidate’s work], to elicit external evaluations, and so on.
That committee, which differs from candidate to candidate, each committee then makes its recommendations about its candidate.” These recommendations go to a six-person elected committee called the Policy Committee. One member is always an untenured assistant professor who
serves a one-year term, and four members serve two-year staggered
terms. This committee then writes a report which it presents to the “voting faculty,” which the chair describes as “the faculty in the tenure system. That would be the simplest answer, plus specialists who are appointed in the, let’s call it the job security system, which is a category set
up for specialists.” It is this more “global” group that then votes on the
candidate; and, to be sure that everyone gets a chance to vote, the departmental bylaws require a mail ballot.
At Shared-Governance U, we again find a variety of departmental
structures. In fact, each department is different.
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The engineering department elects its promotion and tenure committee. As the chair says, “There are four faculty members on it, and two
are elected each year for two-year terms. And they have to be . . . oh, I
don’t remember, they have to be associate or full professor, . . . and tenured.” This committee makes a recommendation to the department head,
who writes his own recommendation and places it in the dossier, which
then goes to the college committee. This staggered elective arrangement
provides for functional and procedural continuity on the committee. And,
since the members are elected by the department as a whole, it is more
likely to be representative of departmental attitudes than a committee
appointed by the chair (although this is not a certainty).
On the other hand, the chemistry department at Shared-Gover nance U has no promotion and tenure committee per se. The chemistry
chair appoints a subcommittee of three people each year to review a
tenure-track candidate’s research and teaching. This subcommittee has
different people each year so that, in the words of the chair, “as many as
fifteen different people look at the candidate and give reports back to the
candidate. This means the entire department is plugged into this process. It’s just not a few people.” The chair noted that “a P&T subcommittee of three or four people who are always the same people and are always the people who sit in judgment, . . . [they] are the gatekeepers.” The
subcommittee then writes a report (called a motion) which it discusses
with both the chair and the candidate. After all the “amendments” are
made to the written report, the report goes to the members of the department who can also make amendments. Once all the amendments have
been made to the motion, that statement goes into the candidate’s file.
The department chair commented that “by the time you have the sub-
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committee chair, and I have talked with the candidate, and the subcommittee chair has talked to the candidate, there usually aren’t many mistakes in fact in the situation.”
One point that the chair also made was what he termed a “subtle
point”: the subcommittee is composed of only one person from the
person’s area and two from outside his or her area. He explained that
this prevents the situation in which a “particular group dominates the
candidate and can lead to really some hard, rough feelings.” So, even
though judging a colleague might be a “gut reaction,” it is a “gut reaction
by the entire promotion and tenure faculty.” Additionally, “there’s a kind
of oral tradition in the department that we should have a 3/4 positive
vote before the recommendation can go forward.” This implies a desire
for departmental consensus for tenuring or promoting a candidate. Only
one other department in this study indicated that it sought a particularly
high degree of agreement for recommending tenure or promotion (chemistry at Bureaucratic U): “. . . if a vote is, say, 60 percent in favor and 40
percent against, it is unlikely that that person is going to get tenure.”
The chemistry chair stated that he is “very concerned about process these days, much more so than I ever was before I became chair.
Because I see what happens when the process doesn’t work right. The
positive aspect of it [the operation in this department] as I see it anyway,
having worked with this system, is that the candidate really sees how the
whole department feels. Not just how the chair of the department feels.
Maybe even how the subcommittee chair, if you just have a P&T subcommittee that works each year and only maybe at the end, when they come
up for review, you’ve got a real problem at that point because sometimes
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the candidate really didn’t realize how some people in the department felt
about him or her.”
The process just outlined is perhaps the most elaborate of all the
P&T processes described in this study. It appears to be a joint effort
among everyone—candidate, subcommittee, department and chair. Moreover, the chair thinks “that the department is happy with it. . . . I have
never had any complaints about the structure we are using in terms of
promotion and tenure.”
The English department at Shared-Governance U also has a reasonably convoluted structure. This department has an elected executive
committee of eight faculty plus the chair and two students; it ratifies
appointments by the chair. The P&T committee itself has five faculty plus
two students serving one-year appointments. This was the only department that reported having students on departmental committees. The
chair made a point of it: “Let me add one thing. All of our committees
have student representation. . . . We usually have an undergraduate and
a graduate student on each of our committees.” The chair also makes an
effort to “make the committee as diverse as possible . . . depending on
our hiring in a particular year, we may or may not be able to have minority representation. But when we are able to, we certainly strive for them.”
But, he notes that “the most important is that the committee be as balanced as possible in terms of gender. . .” No other chair or P&T committee chair stressed the issue of minority status and gender as strongly as
this. The chair of the P&T committee for this year also commented that
they “try to have a set of balances in far as are possible—balances in
terms of seniority, in terms of gender. For us there is not, unfortunately,
much possibility for racial balance. We only have one African-American
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faculty member, and she’s about to take a job somewhere else.” Let us
note here that, although the state board requires students to be involved
in evaluating teaching for promotion and tenure, this department chair is
the only one who mentioned that fact.
When it comes time for promotion or tenure, the P&T committee
reviews materials and votes by secret ballot on whether to recommend a
person for tenure or promotion. This recommendation is made to the
chair, not to the department as a whole. It is interesting to note that the
chair serves on the executive committee, but he or she also appoints
members of the P&T committee, which appointments are ratified by the
committee on which he sits.
To recapitulate, the English department P&T committee is composed of five faculty and two students appointed by the chair for oneyear terms and ratified by the departmental executive committee, on
which the chair sits. The recommendation of the committee goes to the
chair of the department. Except for the election of the executive committee members, this is the most bureaucratic of all the structures examined for this study.
The structure of the P&T process in the psychology department is
the simplest of all: The entire department elects a P&T committee, which
then reviews the dossier of the candidate and presents the material to
the department as a whole. The entire department votes for tenure or
promotion.
The structure of the promotion and tenure committees appears on
the surface to be much more homogeneous at Collegial U than at the
other enterprises. Each department constructs an ad hoc committee for
each person up for review. In each case the ad hoc committee is com-
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posed of two to three members appointed by the chair of the department.
This committee compiles the candidate’s dossier, reviews the documents,
requests reviews from peers, writes reports which are discussed with the
candidate and then either made available to or discussed in a meeting
with all members of the department at or above the rank to which the
candidate will be promoted. What varies from department to department
is the structure of the ad hoc committee—how peers are selected to review the candidate’s scholarship and how the voting is actually conducted (in one case e-mail voting is desired for faculty who cannot be
present in person). And in one department, the committee’s formal report
goes to the chair rather than to the faculty.
The English department chair appoints five people to review a
candidate’s work and write a report. Each person doing a review is supposed to work independently of the others and write an individual, evaluative report. These reports are then all presented to the faculty in an
open meeting of faculty at or above the candidate’s next rank. By this
time, the candidate has seen the reports and has had chance to comment or rebut. The voting faculty can also append comments to the reports. Interestingly, the reports “are given to the department, well, in the
first instance anonymously, and then it’s announced to the department
who it was who actually wrote the reports.”
In the engineering department, there is an appointed ad hoc committee for the purpose of reviewing each candidate, “probably two persons in their area and one person outside their area.” The committee
then gathers information and “writes a report with a recommendation,
including an evaluation of the research. . . . [t]he committee’s report
would be to me . . . And then the entire record of this person’s file would
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be available for all faculty above, I mean in the rank that he’s going to
and above, to review before a faculty meeting is held. And then a faculty
meeting would be held and there would be a discussion. And then there
would be a secret ballot of the faculty, the question being do you agree
with the recommendation of the ad hoc committee or do you disagree
with that, or do you abstain, and make comments?”
The ad hoc committee in the psychology department is appointed
by the chair, as are the others. “I try and pick one person who is reasonably closely related to the area of research that the person is involved in,
that the candidate is involved in. I try to pick a second person to be from
a related area to some degree and I try not to put a faculty member on
more than one promotion committee a year.” The committee writes “an
individualized assessment based on the kind of research that person
does, the area that they’re studying. So we evaluate the person, himself
or herself, on what they’ve accomplished.” The formal report is submitted
to the chair.
From the information collected in the interviews, there is the suggestion that two factors are at work. First, the structure indicated in the
faculty handbook is only minimally carried through to the structure of
the promotion and tenure process at the departmental level. Second,
despite what faculty handbooks indicate is the institutional structure for
promotion and tenure, all institutions essentially follow the shared governance pattern. In fact, the institution with what is apparently the highest
level of faculty control and the least amount of administrative involvement thinks of itself as the epitome of shared governance. However, if we
consider administrative involvement in promotion and tenure decisions
at both the enterprise and departmental levels, and if we consider chairs
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as part of this administration, we can, although with some difficulty,
distinguish among the three authority structures; but as noted, that
differentiation will not agree with the analysis from faculty handbooks.
Collegial U, with its ad hoc committees and departmental voting
structure, epitomizes the collegial structure (even though chairs write
their own evaluation of each candidate and forward that recommendation along with the departmental recommendation to the college dean,
who then forwards his recommendation and the rest of the dossier to the
university committee). With respect to the other two universities, three of
the four departments at Shared-Governance U have appointed P&T committees that serve staggered terms of two to three years; one elects the
chair of the P&T committee, and that person selects the committee. Two
of the four recommend to the chair rather than to the department as a
whole. The other two present the cases to the entire department; and
although everyone can comment on a dossier, only a subset of the department can vote. In one case (chemistry), the structure mirrors that of
Collegial U. At Bureaucratic U, three of the four departments have
elected P&T committees. The one department with a different structure
has no committee, only an ad hoc review group that reports to the department as a whole, which then votes (this, again, mirrors the situation
at Collegial U). In only one case does the P&T committee recommend to
the chair rather than to the department.
One feature of the promotion and tenure process that turned up in
different departments across the different universities was the ad hoc
committee. But use of the ad hoc committee does not appear to be related to structure—it is appointed and in all cases is only advisory or a
data gathering body and thus seems to be the most bureaucratic of de-
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partmental structures; yet it is the only one in evidence at Collegial U.
Only one department in Shared-Governance U has an ad hoc committee:
chemistry (hard, pure science in Biglan’s terminology); two departments
in Bureaucratic U, the shared governance institution, use the ad hoc
committee structure: psychology (soft, applied science) and English (soft,
pure). But all three departments surveyed at Collegial U, the collegial
institution, use the ad hoc committee structure.
It is instructive to notice that in all these instances the department
chair appoints the committee members, but the functions of the committee tend to be somewhat different. In one instance, the ad hoc committee
is purely for information gathering; in fact, the chair noted that the department is constantly “tweaking the process.” All ad hoc committees at
Collegial U collect information and also write reports and reviews that
they then present to the voting members of the department. These
committees, however, are only information gatherers and writers of
reviews of the candidates’ work. The reviewers, rather than writing
recommendations, simply report to the department, which votes in
meeting after discussing the committee reports and the scholarship of
the candidate. This process is also that of the chemistry department at
Shared-Governance U.
The most complicated structure is that of the English department
at Shared-Governance U. In this case there exists an executive committee which ratifies promotion and tenure committee appointees, who write
reviews of the candidates and present those reviews to the chair rather
than to the department. This is also the department that has students on
the committee to provide review of the candidates’ teaching prowess.
Again, despite its existence in a shared-governance authority structure,
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this is a more bureaucratic situation with more layers of decision making. The presence of this structure at this enterprise further upholds the
notion that the structure of the enterprise really does not affect the
structure of the promotion and tenure process at the departmental level.
Thus, we see that Shared-Governance U has more of its departmental committees appointed by the chair; and more of these committees
report to the chair, which makes it appear to be, in actual practice, the
most bureaucratic of our three enterprises. Bureaucratic U has elected
committees in most cases, which are more likely to report to the voting
faculty of the department. The ad hoc structure is the common one at
Collegial U; yet even here not all is the same. In most cases, the ad hoc
committee members can be appointed by the chair but make no recommendations themselves. But in psychology, the ad hoc committee does
make a recommendation, and it goes to the chair rather than to the
department. This process is much more like the bureaucratic SharedGovernance U than other departments at Collegial U.
Only one factor is the same across all institutions: tenure is tied to
promotion to associate professor. It would be convenient to say that
those voting for promotion or tenure must be at or above the level to
which the candidate will be promoted. Although it is true in several departments that even nontenured faculty can comment on dossiers, in all
cases but two, full professors vote on the promotion of associate professors, and associate and full professors vote on the promotion of assistant
professors. And both of these exceptions are the same enterprise: in the
English and chemistry departments at Bureaucratic U, the entire department votes on promotion and tenure cases.
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Operation
Turning now to operation, meaning how decisions about promotion and
tenure are reached we will examine the different areas of consideration
one by one. We will begin by considering criteria for reviewing research:
publications, peer reviews, judgments of quality, funding and collegiality.
Criteria
There are many criteria and many subtle distinctions that departments make in their evaluation, such as the particular journal that a
paper might be published in, or the press that publishes a book, or the
length of the paper. Other considerations that enter the mix include the
number of students a candidate has had (especially PhD students), the
number and amount of external awards, the number of citations, special
awards, student evaluations, colloquia, offers from other institutions,
chapters in books, teaching (which according to almost all chairs and
P&T committee chairs now has a weight equal to or almost equal to research in the tenure and promotion considerations). The basic criteria,
however, are the same across disciplines and universities—publications
and peer review.
Publications
We note at the outset that not all publications carry equivalent
weight in P&T evaluations. The value of a particular type of publication
(journal article, book, technical report) depends on the discipline. In this
respect the research upholds Biglan’s findings of disciplinary differences.
We also find that there may be some justification in Alpert’s opinion that
the goal of achieving excellence has led research universities “into a
rating game that places far greater rewards on conformity than diversity,
measuring performance primarily in terms of original research published
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in scholarly journals. . . . A narrow definition of excellence has also
served to impose the values of the most powerful disciplines on many of
the less prestigious disciplines and professional schools . . . [Alpert,
1991, p. 99]
At the time of the interviews (1997), Shared-Governance U had just
developed a new set of institutional guidelines for promotion and tenure.
The essential concept for this institution is that the work be communicated and “validated”—and they make rather a case of distinguishing
between communicating and publishing. The provost of the university
described validation: “. . .it may be comment; it may be direct evidence
where a new approach, a new technique, a new discovery is being applied and used by others in ways that are helping to shape the discipline
or the field, etc., a new teaching technique that is being used widely by
others, insofar as that can be documented, that suggests that there is
validation of the effectiveness of that technique.”
Communication, he adds, is not just publication—“There are a
variety of ways that that could be done, and it differs across the disciplines as to how that might be done, and particularly with new electronic
kinds of means of information dissemination that there are a variety of
ways to communicate information to peers.” But of course, the ultimate
test is communication-—that “there be documented evidence that indeed
it has been communicated and that others have validated the significance of that.” The chemistry chair commented that “just doing it themselves in the lab and never getting it out to anyone else probably doesn’t
really make it.” Shared-Governance U was the only institution to make
this fine distinction between publication and communication, validation
and citation. But it is instructive to quote once again from the chair of
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chemistry: “. . . we have started in the last two or three years asking the
candidate to write a statement along with their CV so that we can more
fully appreciate what their impact has been in the various areas of teaching, scholarship and service.” This is the only department interviewed
that is asking candidates to make such a statement for the file, and it is
the only one developing a “portfolio” requirement.
On the other hand, the chair of psychology notes that “everyone
uses his or her own judgment in each individual case. There is a global
perspective. There is an arbitrariness about numerically coding
someone’s performance. How do you specify quality?” Of course, that is
the question that almost everyone in academe is struggling with in much
the same way.
The engineering chair says that “things culminate, really, in scholarly publications. And we look at those scholarly publications and a very
crucial item in them is ‘Is the person publishing in the appropriate vehicles for the work they are doing?’ It doesn’t have to be in the most
prestigious journals in a whole general area if other ones are more appropriate.” While the engineers at Shared-Governance U look at appropriateness of the vehicle (and perhaps also its quality level or prestige),
the engineers at Bureaucratic U use a formula that gives refereed journals so many points, conference proceedings so many points, book chapters so many points, and so on. This was the only department in the
study that uses a formula. But despite the use of a formula in its annual
reviews (which are also used for computing raises), the chair said that
“there is no single model of any kind, you know, for performance.”
The English department at Shared-Governance U makes a point of
seeking “intellectual quality”: “. . .it’s the absolute intellectual quality I
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would say is what’s spoken to. Usually things like anthologies or teaching material don’t count, or collections, edited things don’t count very
much. What’s looked for is a work of original research or original criticism. And this of course isn’t true in many other departments, but it
happens to be kind of tradition in ours.” Clearly he is saying that there
are departments at Collegial U that do not require originality in scholarship for promotion and tenure. He continued: “I should have said before
on the idea of standards that the usual expectation is that the person
will complete and have accepted a book for publication, although that’s
not always the case. It’s usually completed, maybe not accepted. And
that’s a kind of unspoken requirement. . .”
A candidate in the English department at Bureaucratic U is expected to have “a substantial set of refereed items—in print—now, we’ve
defined substantial set of refereed items to mean . . . equivalent in aggregate as well as in scope and depth to an individually authored book.” It is
the publication record that is of paramount importance, and also “the
quality of the press that did the publishing,” according to the English
chair at Bureaucratic U.
At Shared-Governance U, the chair of the English department said
that “evidence of distinction and national recognition in scholarship. . .”
is necessary for promotion and tenure. The P&T committee chair was
slightly more specific, saying that “. . .we don’t have a set number of
publications that are required for promotion to associate and tenure and
promotion to full, but we all have some kind of rough sense of what
amounts to a substantive, substantial amount of scholarship.” He noted
further that the department wants to be assured that “the scholarship is
contributing importantly within the discipline.” However, as we shall see,
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the English department at Shared-Governance U places greatest reliance
on external peer reviews.
The chemistry department at Shared-Governance U has similarly
fuzzy guidelines. When asked about specific written guidelines or criteria,
the chair said, “We don’t have anything in writing like that. That is fair to
say. At least, I haven’t been able to find any P&T guidelines in our department that says you must have, uh, you know, three grants approved
or you must have six papers written or you must have something else, X,
Y, or Z. We do not have that.” In like fashion, the chemistry department
at Bureaucratic U has recently been through “a discussion to specify
more closely what the criteria for promotion and tenure [are], and that
was a discussion that scored at a low level in the department.”
Given the variability in reliance on publications and the expressed
differences in types of publications, we see that Biglan’s findings about
disciplinary differences are upheld in this instance. In the words of the
chair of the universitywide faculty personnel committee at Collegial U,
“Well, we look at publications. That’s a primary indicator, what’s the
person publishing, where are they publishing. We look at reviews, impact, citations. We look at . . . um . . . sometimes there are different . . .
you know again, once again, this is a matter that varies by taste and by
discipline. In the humanities typically someone will not publish many
articles; they’ll be writing a book, and it may take six, seven, eight years
to publish a book.” Disciplinary difference show up again: “Whereas, for
example, if that same subject matter is being studied by someone who is
from a disciplinary point of view a sociologist in a different unit like a
public policy school, a social welfare school, we might look at different
criteria. We might not look at, for example, methodological rigor; we’ll
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look at policy impact; we’ll look at who’s reading and using this work;
we’ll look at its relationship to the practice of social work in a social
welfare school or to its policy impact in a public policy school.” It is evident, at least at Collegial U, that the university committee recognizes and
takes into consideration disciplinary differences in scholarship and other
activities.
The provost at Shared-Governance U said that “the important
thing is there be documented evidence that indeed it has been communicated and that others have validated the significance of that.” It does not
necessarily mean publication in the traditional sense. He continued,
saying that “there are a variety of ways that that could be done, and it
differs across the disciplines as to how that might be done, and particularly with new electronic kinds of means of information dissemination
that there are a variety of ways to communicate information to peers.”
This, of course, is a very broad interpretation, one that some departments or disciplines might be uncomfortable with. Interestingly enough,
all the chairs interviewed felt the new guidelines and definitions were
appropriate and consonant with their disciplines, that the new guidelines
occasioned no major changes in the way things were done or in the type
of decisions made.

External Peer Review
Much more consensus and similarity across both institutions and
disciplines is evident when we examine the way departments conduct
peer review of scholarship. All require some kind of peer review, which is
effectively an evaluation of a candidate’s work with respect to its importance to and impact on the discipline. And, as we shall see, Shared-
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Governance U appears to place the greatest reliance on external peer
reviews, Collegial U the least.
The chair of engineering at Shared-Governance U commented that
peer reviews “are very, very important. Are they overriding? . . . I think
the initial answer is yes. If the external reviews come out generally negative, then there has to be a very preponderance of other information to
make the case viable, which is very rarely done.” He added that external
peer review could “give some additional evaluation, if you will, as to
whether a person is publishing in the right areas and whether they are
of a reasonable stature or not.”
At Collegial U, outside reviewers are asked to “be quite specific in
terms of those accomplishments and also in terms of how these stand
relative to others in the world who work in that area.”
The chair of the promotion and tenure committee of the engineering department at Bureaucratic U said that “[e]xternal reviews are not
the only criterion by which people are given tenure or promoted, but it
certainly is a strong part of the process. And I think that the reputation
of the institution or the record in the institution as well as the record of
the individual external reviewer are quite important in how seriously
those reviews are taken by the department, college and the university.”
Further, the department, at the strong suggestion of the institution, takes a somewhat different approach by seeking reviewers from a
certain set of institutions: “Reviews from faculty, and typically these are
reviews from faculty members, reviews from faculty members who are
either serving at an academic level at or below the faculty member under
review or from a non-Big Ten Plus institution tend to be not taken as
seriously as those reviews from faculty members serving at a level above
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the candidate under consideration and from a Big Ten Plus institution. .
. . the . . . uh . . . the higher . . . the academic ranking of the institution
and the more well known the person is from which that review is obtained, within the technical area or within the academic area of the person under review, the more likely that that review will be taken strongly.”
In psychology, all departments have a similar attitude about outside peer reviews. At Collegial U, the reviewers are asked “for an evaluation of the contribution, of the significance of the research in the field,
the impact.” But this department also uses “both internal and external
[reviews]—that’s for cases of promotion from assistant to associate and
from associate to full professor. If it’s an advancement within rank, say
within associate or within full professor, we only use internal review.” At
Bureaucratic U, again outside reviews are important, although there is
balance: “. . . we look for consistency between what the outside people
say and what the inside people say. We really have never had a situation
where there was a big disagreement between what the outside people
were saying and what the inside people were saying, so it has never
really come up as an issue. You know, who are we going to go with, the
outside people or the inside people? We just haven’t had to deal with that
problem.” At Shared-Governance U, however, the chair noted that
“choosing outside reviewers is almost incestuous because everyone is out
to protect his own field.”
Interviews were conducted in only two chemistry departments, but
those again show the same pattern of relying on outside peer reviews. At
Shared-Governance U, the chair said that they “let the outside reviewers
tell us whether we are right or not” [about the department’s evaluation of
the impact of a candidate’s work]. . . . We had one tenured last year in
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material science, for example. . . . We knew we were going to get good
letters back because they [departmental faculty] said we were going to
get good letters back.” He also pointed out a case in which the department had no expertise. “I told the candidate, you know, unless your
outside letters come in really, really good, you are out of here; and he
said, ‘Fine, I am going to have very good outside letters.’ And we went to
people at Berkeley, Harvard, and MIT; I mean, we hit the absolutely top
schools for outside letters, and we got back great letters. So we said,
You’re in.” At Bureaucratic U, the department looks for “experts in the
person’s field of expertise. And that may take us anywhere.”
In English, the picture is much the same. Every department makes
use of external peer reviews. The chair of the English committee at
Shared-Governance U noted that “the process within the committee
differs each time.” The emphasis is also similar to what has gone before,
although in one case, Collegial U, the chair commented that “we don’t
always pay very much attention to those. We care more about our own
judgment. But superior reviewers in the system, the ones who take. .
.consider our recommendation, might very well pay more attention to
those than we do.” This department permits anonymous, written reviews
of the candidate’s scholarship, which may all be submitted by peers
within the department. One person suggested that Collegial U would
naturally not require external peer review because it considers itself in a
league by itself to such an extent that it has no peers.
So, we see that, even though the English department at Collegial
U requires external reviews, they consider them of little significance. Is
this a disciplinary or institutional difference? With so few departments
under consideration, it is difficult to determine. But the suggestion is

Chapter IV: Discussion and Analysis

66

that it is not a disciplinary difference, but perhaps a function of the
institutional structure since the chair of engineering at this university
also suggested that external reviews were only requested for tenure and
major promotions and may not carry as much weight as the internal
reviewers’ comments.
On the other hand, when we look at Shared-Governance U, we see
again heavy reliance on external reviews: “In terms of scholarship, that
[distinction and national recognition] is primarily determined through
external evaluation, and an important part of the promotion and tenure
process here is the solicitation of evaluations of the candidate’s work
from leaders of the field around the country. So we look for high-quality
external evaluators and very much rely on their judgments of the significance and quality of the faculty member’s work.” The chair of the promotion and tenure committee repeated this statement almost verbatim: “We
also read the materials, but we do put heavy emphasis on the external
reviewers. . . . We make sure we know what we are dealing with, but for
the evaluation and the quality of the work, we rely heavily on external
reviewers.”
The English department at Bureaucratic U “gives a lot of weight” to
the recommendations of external reviewers; the chair will also “assess
the letter of evaluation itself.” But in this department, we see a somewhat
different emphasis on the external reviews—it prefers to request letters
from that institution’s “peer institutions, and those are the ones I will tell
the chairpersons of the individual search committee to try to get nominations from.” In putting together the list of reviewers, consideration is
given to “the quality or the level of the institution of the person whose
evaluation is being solicited.” But even more pointedly, the chair said
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that he “would hate to send up to the dean external evaluations from
four faculty, all of whom who [sic] are at schools that Bureaucratic U,
rightly or wrongly, does not see as comparable.”
The chair of the chemistry department at Bureaucratic U also
sought external reviewers from “other research institutions that are
regarded as being peer to Bureaucratic U.” Although he did say that
“what we are looking for is experts in the person’s field of expertise. And
that may take us anywhere.” In engineering, also, “reviews from big . . .
what is referred to as the Big Ten Plus institutions tend to be the most
effective reviews in terms of department and college tenure and promotion action.” Reviews from faculty at other institutions (the non-Big Ten
ones) “tend to not be taken as seriously. . .”
While on the subject of the list of external reviewers, we should
examine in more detail how that list is constructed. It is not, perhaps,
surprising that every department interviewed followed much the same
procedures with much the same philosophy. Namely, the candidate
provides a list of names of people who can be asked for reviews and the
review committee or P&T committee provides a list of names. In every
department, the candidate can provide a list of names of people who
should not be asked for evaluations. In some cases, the candidate can
work with the committee to develop the list of external evaluators. In
each case the department chair or the P&T committee chair abides by
the wishes of the candidate in not asking certain people for reviews.
In this respect, the engineering chair at Collegial U said, “I also ask
the candidate to supply me with a name or two if they wish of persons
they would not want me to ask. So they, you know, if they have cultivated an enemy so to speak along the way by some sort of run-in they’ve
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had with someone over some issue or something, and they would not feel
comfortable with that person evaluating them, then can make that
known to me and I would not do so.” Also at Collegial U, the English
department chair noted that “the candidate can say, you know, ‘I don’t
think so-and-so likes me, I would appreciate it if that person didn’t review. In that case we might not.’” Let us note here that it appears to be
more of an issue at Collegial U that the candidate have an opportunity to
provide names of those who should not be asked to provide reviews. Two
of three chairs mentioned this issue spontaneously; neither department
heads nor P&T committee chairs at either of the other two institutions
brought this topic up [and since Collegial U was the last one to be interviewed, the question could not be added for all interviewees].
In the English department at Bureaucratic U, the “individual candidate . . .gives that committee a list of five names of people who are, in
the judgment of the candidate, qualified to be approached for external
reviews. All right? The committee then develops a list of its own that
includes some of the candidate’s nominees but cannot consist only of the
candidate’s nominees.” However, in the engineering department, the
review committee may or may not ask the candidate for a list of names.
“The review committee certainly is free to do that. In some cases, they do
that; I have . . . It’s not an established part of the protocol for obtaining
external reviews.” This is the only department at the bureaucratic and
shared-governance institutions to have external peer reviews optional.
At Shared-Governance U, the English department develops a list
from “the suggestions from the candidate and then from others that the
candidate does not propose. . .to make sure we have the right people
doing this. . .” The subcommittee in the chemistry department at Shared-
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Governance U “chooses, . . .with the candidate. . . the outside reviewers.
We ask the candidate to give a list of, say, six to eight names, and we
choose usually half the names that we go to from that list. And then the
subcommittee chooses a group of another three or four people to send
letters to.” The engineering department at Bureaucratic U “asks the
candidates themselves, and then in addition to that, people on the promotion and tenure committee will take a look at a list of . . . will generate
a list of people we think are capable of reviewing this particular candidate. And then the department chairman also has input to that list.”
Quality and “High Standards”
The next question to examine is that of quality and “high standards.” This is, of course, the primary concern of tenure and promotion
committees and the subject of the review of research. We find that all
universities and departments in the study (and probably all universities
everywhere) are concerned with maintaining or improving “quality” and
“high standards” according to their definition of what that means. And,
as it turns out, most departments at most universities openly base that
definition on an evaluation of their own faculty’s performance and acclaim; but it is an evaluation executed by faculty at other institutions.
The chair of the psychology department at Bureaucratic U was typical
when he unhesitatingly responded that “We do outside letters” to determine whether someone has outstanding performance—“We use peer
judgment, the faculty, you know, make a judgment about tenure faculty.” Alpert’s comments that the use of published papers in professional
journals as a measure of research performance leads to conformity and
the imposition of “the values and the mission of the outstanding research
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institutions on most of the other colleges and universities” also applies to
the use of external peer reviews. [See Alpert, p. 99].
We also find during this discussion that “quality” is a subjective
concept, based on the judgment of a group of people and informed by the
judgments of yet other individuals. Those involved appear to recognize
the inherent subjectivity of the process, and there is a clear attempt to
reduce or eliminate any capriciousness by involving groups of evaluators
(rather than individuals) at different stages of the process, and in most
instances over a number of years.
To achieve the objective of maintaining quality, as we have already
seen, every department makes use of external peer reviews to some extent in the evaluation of research and scholarship. Only two departments
rely heavily on their own departmental reviews; the others place great
weight on individuals outside the home institution. Some, as at Bureaucratic U, want the preponderance of those reviews to come from their
“peer” institutions. Others are satisfied with reviews from the “top” individuals in the area under consideration. The following discussion examines statements about quality and excellence by institution rather than
by discipline because it appears that this concept is guided more
strongly than any other by institutional norms and structure.
The chair of the university committee at Collegial U noted that
“academic standards and expectations vary so much from discipline to
discipline. . . . and our expectations of . . . different kinds of work will be
different because the missions of the schools are different.” When asked
about outside letters, this person said that “you can get a file where you
have recommenders from institutions which are not on a level with Collegial U. And you might view that with some suspicion. But it could be that
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these institutions have first-rate departments in the area in which the
candidate is working; or it could be that the very best people in the
candidate’s field don’t work at first-rate institutions but at other kinds of
institutions. So you have to understand the nature of the persons, the
department and the institutions from which the letters come. . . . the
general theory is that you want a candidate reviewed by the best people
in the field in which the candidate works.” There is, from this response,
clearly an understanding that some of the best people may work at less
prestigious places.
Along these lines, the chair of engineering stated, “And every case
has to be based specifically on research, teaching and service—university
service and professional service. And honors and awards. So every case
that’s made has an analysis of those aspects of a person’s professorship.
And so then you’d say, well how do you evaluate their research? Well, we
look at first of all their list of publications in the refereed archival journals and/or refereed papers in conference proceedings. And the first
thing we do I guess is count them. If they are zero, then there’s not much
to say. But we count the number and then we, the people who are on
these ad hoc committees who are supposed to be knowledgeable in their
area would review these papers and pass judgment on their quality. And
then we also, in these promotion steps, we ask outside reviewers in this
person’s area of expertise to give a written evaluation of the person’s
research accomplishments. And we request that they be quite specific in
terms of those accomplishments and also in terms of how these stand
relative to others in the world who work in that area.”
The chair of the universitywide committee at Collegial U said, “You
know, the sense of what, what is necessary . . . for promotion to tenure
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or what. . . You know, these are standards that one can articulate, but in
actuality, their meaning lies in their implementation. And one is always
trying to calibrate them with the way one has implemented them in the
past, to be equitable about it. So, yes, it’s constantly the case that we are
cross-checking and comparing.” This statement may be viewed as a note
of caution and a statement that those involved in making decisions are
aware of the inherent subjectivity of the endeavor and so are continually
trying to make it less so. At the same time, he noted that “what we do as
scholars all the time is make these judgments, don’t we? So we do what
you would do as a scholar in your own field—say this work is good, this
work is bad.”
But there is also an undertone of what a few of the chairs at Bureaucratic U said—there is clearly a desire to have letters from the most
prestigious universities. The English department seeks “a clear publication record in first rate cases, in the particular area or field of specialization . . .” This department also looks at “the quality of the press that did
the publishing” and puts candidates through a “stringent examination.”
In the words of the chair, “The reports themselves [of the departmental
review committee] are of very high quality. It’s often said that the work of
the candidate doesn’t get any better reviews than it gets inside those
walls at the review meetings. It’s simply the originality and the worth of
the scholarship, of the writing, and its quality. It’s based on its intellectual quality as perceived by the reviewers.”
With respect to standards of quality and excellence, the chair of
the English department at Bureaucratic U said, “And that [a memorandum from the associate provost] sets out some criteria for promotion
consideration, which includes such things as improving the quality of the
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faculty, which frankly I read as saying that the standards today cannot
be the same as we had twenty years ago. That they should be higher.
That the university is asking more, rather than the same or less than it
once had.”
The chair of psychology said his department was always tweaking
the process. This appears to indicate a desire to eliminate as much subjectivity as possible and to make the promotion and tenure decisions as
equitable as possible. “We like to evaluate the candidate against some
kind of impersonal standard rather than against the others that are
coming out. But of course in practical fact, that is impossible. I mean,
you can’t be unaware of the relative strengths of two candidates that
come up together, but we attempt to evaluate the candidates individually
on their own terms. . .”
In engineering at Bureaucratic U, the department examines several
factors to determine quality: “Well, the major ones that we look at are
published journal articles, archival journal articles, published conference
proceedings that are reviewed, contributions to books or research monographs and things like that, published that is, and production of PhD
students, production of master’s students, primarily with thesis is what
we’re most interested in although we have some students. . .we don’t
have a lot of students who go through without doing a thesis but some
do, and they don’t count very much in our scheme. A master’s student
who completes a thesis counts a fractional part of a PhD student in some
measurable way. Research expenditures,. . .those are the main things.”
But, he also added that he discusses with the candidates “some rough
idea of norms. But I point out that there is no single model of any kind
you know, for performance.”
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In the chemistry department at Shared-Governance U, there is a
clear intent that the candidate should be “excellent” in his or her area:
“We have typically hired people and evaluated, tried to pick the very best
in our judgment in terms of fitting into our system early on and then see
if they have met the criteria that we have for promotion and tenure. . . .
The people in the department who are in the area under consideration
have their own sense as to whether [the candidate is meeting expectations of ‘significant scholarship and uniformly high standards’]. And then
hopefully we make good choices with respect to the outside reviewers,
and we let the outside reviewers tell us whether we are right or not.”
Other Concerns
Interviewees mentioned several additional factors that contribute
to a determination of excellence, other than publications, validation and
peer evaluation. The most prominent of these were external funding,
hiring practices, annual reviews, and, interestingly, collegiality.
At two universities, the concept of “fitting in” and “collegiality”
were important, at one because the university guidelines require “collegiality.” But what does this mean and how do departments interpret it?
The concept of “fitting in” meshes well with this university’s requirement
of collegiality in its guidelines. When asked about this provision, department chairs and P&T committee chairs all agreed that it had not been an
issue to date but they would not want to either hire or tenure a faculty
member who was highly divisive or disruptive in the department.
In the words of the English P&T committee chair: “You know, that’s
one of those sort of tricky areas where you’ve got to find some kind of
middle ground between one extreme using this as sort of a hammer to
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force everyone to conform to some kind of party line but at the other
extreme to have faculty who simply are not cooperative, who don’t contribute to the department. So, the term collegiality there is meant to
provide an opportunity to require and expect your faculty to be contributing members of the department.” He further said that the statement
“is meant to guarantee the faculty that you choose to tenure and keep as
your colleagues indefinitely are going to be contributing members of the
department who serve on committees when asked and are people who get
along with other people.”
The English chair said, “it would weigh heavily if it was determined
that someone could not work effectively with colleagues and could not
work effectively toward common departmental interests, then that would
be, I would say, a problem.” The psychology chair said, “Collegiality is
important. I don’t mind people who disagree, but there should be respect
for the department—departmental citizenship.”
The chemistry chair had a somewhat different view of collegiality.
His interpretation was to involve a number of people in the promotion
and tenure process to avoid hurt feelings: The process the department
uses “gives more collegiality because more people are involved.” Further,
he commented that “if feelings get damaged in promotion and tenure,
that kind of hurt can continue for years. I mean, it can continue for a
whole lifetime, and people won’t work that well together for ten years, for
God’s sake; and all you’ve done is decrease the capability of your department to be effective.”
Only one other chair mentioned collegiality, or in his terms, citizenship. The chair of psychology at Bureaucratic U came very close to
mirroring the statement of the psychology chair at Shared-Governance
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U: “. . .for promotion to full professor . . . we look a little bit more at
departmental citizenship, as I said before, for going to full professor than
we do for tenure and promotion to associate. But basically it is the same.
We want people to do it all. We are very selfish about that, or greedy.”

Dissension in the Ranks
Comments from several interviewees point to what some would consider
an anomaly—namely, there appears to be remarkably little dissension
within departments and also between faculty and upper administration
when it comes to promotion and tenure, despite the fact that received
wisdom and anecdotal evidence point to just the opposite. The first indication of this was the statement from several chairs that, during their
tenure as chair, the faculty their departments “send up” for tenure have
always succeeded (although this was not always the case for promotion
from associate professor to full professor). The second indication was the
statement from provosts and associate provosts that they listen to what
the departments tell them and only in extremely rare cases decide contrary to departmental recommendations. The third indication was the
fact that, with only one exception, all the chairs said that deans and
provosts thought highly of their departmental promotion and tenure
practices and the direction their departments were taking. Even within
departments, there was no indication (except in one instance) of divisive
differences among the faculty or the faculty and chair—disagreement,
yes, definitely, but no real dissension. A large measure of consensus was
in evidence in every department.
Let us examine each of these three indicators more fully, institution by institution:
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Tenure Success
At Shared-Governance U, the English department has, in the words of
the chair, a “fairly high” success rate—he could only think of “a couple of
cases” of people “who have been denied tenure who have put themselves
forward over the years.” But he noted that several factors enter into the
equation: “There have been faculty who have declined to put themselves
forward or who have withdrawn before the conclusion of the process . . .
The ones that are most likely to succeed are the faculty who go through
the process.” Of the four cases this chair has supervised, all were successful in their bids for either promotion or tenure.
The same picture holds true in the psychology department, where
all departmental recommendations for tenure in the past several years
have been upheld. The chair of psychology at Shared-Governance U said
that “it would be unusual for the college or university to overturn a departmental P&T decision. In the past eight years, there have been five
tenure decisions and no decisions not to tenure.” The only indication of
major disagreement was the case of a minority candidate “who we had
hired on a very affirmative action program a few years back who turned
out not to be satisfactory—a very poor teacher and did no research. If
that individual hadn’t have left, I’m sure the department would have
turned him down for promotion and tenure. And I’m equally sure the
university would have awarded it. But other than that circumstance, I
think that the department’s opinion would be listened to.”
In chemistry, the chair said “my concern is if the department and
the chair and everybody pulling as hard as the candidate is to make this
whole thing work.” He believes his department has an 80 percent success rate.
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In engineering, the success rate is also high. Of the cases [and the
number is undetermined], the chair noted, “. . . and I think all of these,
my memory is a little bit fuzzy on one, all of these men. . .people who. .
.uh, who the decision was negative, once it got essentially up to the
dean’s level with negative connotations decided to resign rather than be
terminated.” He commented further that the department has “typically
hired people and evaluated, tried to pick the very best in our judgment in
terms of fitting into our system early on and then see if they have met
the criteria that we have for promotion and tenure.” The chair said that
one person the department had given a lukewarm recommendation for
promotion (this was not a tenure case) was turned down by the administration. But, it was a “judgment call. . . . I have no problem with it coming down saying, well, you know, these guys are right and he needs to
develop his outside reputation a little better before we push this one
through.” This person “won’t go up this year, I know that. He might go up
next year again.” In that same department, a candidate that the chair
thought “might not make it” did so “on the strength of his outside letters.
Everyone that we wrote to, which were the best people we could find in
the field, said “Man, you’ve got to tenure this guy. He solved a problem
that people have been working on for years and have been unable to
solve. So we tenured him, and I think we’ve been happy with that—even
though he did not have very many publications. And he had had only a
few grants at that point.”
In all of the cases in which a candidate failed to be tenured, “it was
a combination of the teaching and the research/scholarship which were
the issues.” So, the tenure process in this situation is possibly viewed as
a validation of how will the department picks its beginning assistant
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professors. If this is the case, the department has a vested interest in
tenuring those it has hired in the first place. Is it perhaps a question of
resources, time and internal reputation?
Turning to Bureaucratic U, the engineering chair said that he did
not “think that the department in the last ten or 12 years at least has
ever recommended for tenure that it hasn’t gone through.” There are
good reasons for that to occur, he explained. First, the department has “a
tenure track position for each person we hire. So, if we make good judgments and then bring a person along effectively, we could in principle,
with confidence, tenure everybody that we hire.” But, since they “don’t
always get it right . . . and sometimes a person’s changed his or her own
mind,” not everyone gets tenured. Second, “promotion doesn’t come up
as a major departure from our way of doing things. It’s more of an intensification and a focus.” Third, the chair said, “We’re hard on ourselves,
feeling it’s better to be hard on ourselves and then be able to argue effectively than sort of cast it out there and hope.” The chair of the P&T committee noted that “candidates self-select themselves not to be reviewed.”
He also commented that “the department has historically appointed quite
strong candidates at the beginning assistant and associate professor
levels. We’ve done a good job searching. . .” In the 16 years he has been
in the department, there have only been four negative departmental
reviews, and the college and institutional have upheld all departmental
decisions.
In the psychology department, the incumbent has been chair for
16 years; in that time, “I haven’t had any recommendation refused,” and
only one person got as far as the penultimate year prior to the tenure
decision when it became evident he would not be tenured, and he re-
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signed. The department currently has “one person who is sort of on the
fence . . . but that person is two years away from a decision.” Again, the
tenure success rate is very high because of strong hiring practices, yearly
reviews and discussions with candidates “because we don’t want surprises.” The chair added quite positively that “we want to send up very
strong cases. And frankly we want those cases to be, if you like, a notch
or so above the other units that are in the college. And I think it has
served us well over the years.; and I think it has helped to promote the
effort to increase the reputation of the department of psychology in terms
of the productivity of the faculty . . . And I haven’t had any recommendation refused in the 16 years that I’ve been chair.” Additionally, if there is
a somewhat weaker case that the department wants to promote, the
record of strong candidates allows him “to put more muscle behind that
argument. So, it’s worked very well, I think.”
The chair of the English department, which has a somewhat complicated committee structure, presented a slightly less homogeneous
picture of the promotion and tenure process. Even though he has never
recommended contrary to the Policy Committee recommendations, that
committee has recommended differently from the individual P&T committees. Additionally, none of his recommendations on tenure or promotion have been overturned at a higher level. He did stress that the dean
and the university had the right to do so, but never have.
The chemistry department at Bureaucratic U was the only one
interviewed that had denied tenure to a candidate (four years prior to
this study), and this on the grounds of lack of originality in research. In
addition, the chair said that his recommendation was different from that
of the P&T committee. There “was a heated discussion which was just
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fine. In the end, I think there was consensus, in the sense that we were
going in the right direction.” Notably, he commented that “if a vote is,
say, 60 percent in favor and 40 percent against, it is unlikely that that
person is going to get tenure. . . . if there was that much concern on the
part of the faculty, then that is not a strong show of support.” Since
1996, the department had denied promotion to only one person.
At the level of the institution, the associate provost said, “If you do
a cohort analysis, which if you start, you know, with a set of folks coming
in and then said how many of those would be promoted and tenured
after the six-year review period, you’d have about an 80 percent rate. But
that includes people who are not renewed in the first term, or unfortunately die, or change jobs, or are counseled out, and so on. But when we
actually come to the set of folks on the list who come up at the end for
the six-year period, uh, the tenure rate is about 90 percent.”
Collegial U, the collegial structure, presents much the same picture. In English, “You have a chance clear through to tenure. You have a
clear shot at tenure. You have to lose it not to get it.” At the same time,
however, the chair said that when he first came to the university, “about
one of every two candidates failed. But now the percentage is much
higher, probably nine out of ten make it, or maybe even more. So that
shows a shift in the way things are done.” He commented that one departmental consensus against tenuring a candidate was reversed by the
administration; although when presented with additional arguments, the
administration subsequently reversed its own decision. In psychology,
every “everyone who came in as an assistant professor with the exception
of one person . . . has gotten tenure” since the early 70s. Moreover, only
one person in the past few years who has “come up for an advancement
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within rank . . . was turned down.” In engineering, “We have promoted
every junior faculty person to tenure that, on schedule, plus or minus a
year or so, as we had hoped we would and planned to do.”
Administrative and Departmental Agreement
While the departments and chairs say they are being so successful
with tenure and promotion candidates (and, as we have seen, the primary goal of some chairs is to be the advocate for the department and
candidate), what are the associate provosts saying about their agreement
or disagreement with departmental recommendations? At each university, the chief administrator in charge of promotion and tenure decisions
was interviewed. Each of them said that they agreed with departmental
recommendations an average of 85 percent of the time (both negative and
positive promotion recommendations). In fact, all associate provosts and
provosts interviewed stated categorically that they would not normally
turn aside the decision of the department and college and would never
do so unilaterally—in fact, in the past two years only one positive recommendation from both department and college was overturned at the
institutional level at all three universities. (Exact comparative numbers
for promotion and tenure decisions are unavailable because associate
provosts and provosts were uncertain about how many cases they actually review.) Positive departmental recommendations with negative or
lukewarm college recommendations tend to be overturned more often—
on the order of 2 – 5 percent. It is thus clear that most disagreements
between department and institutional administration occur in departments other than those interviewed. But even these are few in number.
Let us examine the comments of the top academic administrators.
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The associate provost at Shared-Governance U said that “of the
105 dossiers that came up, 12 were denied promotion and five were
denied tenure. Now some of the promotion and tenure were similar so. . .
[meaning that these were cases in which the candidate was going for
both tenure and promotion to associate professor, which is the norm at
every institution].” But, he noted he was “not sure from the summary
how many of the denials agreed with the college and the department.” He
believes that he disagreed with the department and college recommendations that year in about 5 percent of the cases. Structurally, the decision-making committee at Shared-Governance U is composed of all administrators, and they depend heavily on comments in the outside letters
and dean, college and department recommendations, “so it is only when
it is an unusual case that we overturn what’s done in the college or department. Our goal is to, you know, to concur with all of the recommendations, although there are times when it appears to us that something
is amiss and we call it. . . . So it’s not that our charge is only to look at
procedural things.” He said the role of the university committee “is primarily to be sure that the process is working properly, that there are not
misinterpretations of the guidelines. . .” They seek “equity between the
different units.”
The provost commented that the role at the university level is “to
see whether units have adequately considered all of the factors as they
have made their recommendations.” He explained one case two years
previous in which the department had recommended a candidate for
tenure but the college had not: “. . . and it was clear that the college
committee and the dean both used a very narrow and traditional definition of scholarly expectations and did not adequately consider two factors
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in my view. One is it was a minority faculty member, one of the first
ones, actually THE first one in that department and one of the very few
in that college, and in that case I posed a whole series of questions back
to the dean about to what extent had the department and the college
made efforts to provide the kind of support that was necessary to allow
this person to be successful in their assignment. I also asked to what
extent they had considered the kinds of special demands on this person’s
time created by the fact that a whole parade of students and others were
immediately interested in having access to this person and that . . . that .
. . indeed the person had made significant contributions in both teaching
and particularly advising of students, and in some cases faculty colleagues, but there seemed to be no recognition or acknowledgment of
that as an important contribution in the evaluations that were made at
the college level. And so in that case I posed a whole series of questions
as to how they had dealt with a number of these things. After receiving
their answers, then I considered the case and their responses, and I
made the decision that indeed this person had accomplished what was
necessary to be awarded tenure.”
So here we have an explicit explanation of how one case was decided in favor of the candidate at the highest level. Both associate provost and provost agreed that their primary roles at the institutional level
were to examine the dossier as a complete document.
The provost further said that the cases that failed in their bids for
promotion or tenure did so for one of two reasons: “This past year, I
think in every case, it had to do with a failure to document satisfactorily
that indeed there were original contributions that met the definition of
scholarship—that is it had been communicated with peers and had been
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validated by others, and actually the definition was very useful in being
able to distinguish some cases where the evidence simply wasn’t there. If
it had occurred, the dossier was not adequately prepared in a way that
made it clear that that had happened. . . .
“The other category is not related to scholarship but related to the
basic performance of assigned responsibilities. Inadequate performance
in teaching or in outreach functions in particular or where there was
evidence in the evaluations of those performances that had come forward
and suggested some real questions about effectiveness in outreach functions where there were serious problems with clientele relationships or
with the reactions of clients, particularly principle clients who expected
to be served by that individual. So those would be the two categories,
either a failure to document scholarship satisfactorily or a failure or
deficiencies in the basic performance of assigned responsibilities.”
We see here a much looser definition of scholarship than might be
expected at a Carnegie Research I institution (or than is evident at other
institutions) as well as an administrative structure that appears traditionally bureaucratic and quite attuned to concerns other than traditional scholarship.
At Bureaucratic U, the associate provost said there was a time
when “deans would come with a very large set of promotional recommendations. What they wanted to do was to be told that the people were not
strong and then they could go back and tell the chair, ‘Well, I’d like to
have done it, but the provost turned it back.’ The situation is different
now, he said, so much so that he turns back recommendations very
seldom—”a couple a year on the average.” These are the mandatory
cases, he explains, and are only “a couple a year because we’ve worked
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very hard to make sure that we don’t get very many cases that departments and deans endorse but we have to turn back. And that flows from
this on-going set of interactions about expectations, so people know the
kind of people, the kind of records that they really need to sustain. But
there are always cases for which there’s disagreement on a variety of
issues . . . .”
Concerning the nonmandatory cases of promotion from associate
to full professor, Bureaucratic U has a somewhat unusual slant on the
process. The deans compile a list of candidates for promotion and gather
the dossiers. The associate provost reviews the dossiers and then meets
with the deans. On questionable cases, the associate provost “raises a
bunch of questions, and the dean talks about them, and you raise more
questions and issues, and then this meeting always precedes the final
formal recommendation that comes forward, so they are preliminary in
that sense. In a number of cases, these names never reappear again.
Now, we never really say, we are not going to endorse Jones or Green or
Brown, but we raised a series of questions about the dossier and the
case, and you know, the dean considers all of this and in most instances,
those folks will disappear and return at a later date when they’ve had
their record enhanced.” When asked what the primary reasons might be
for turning down a tenure bid, he said the major one is “lack of either
evidence or predicted evidence about an effective research and scholarly
base. . . .but each of these cases is particularistic, and as I said, I want
to communicate, they are very, very few.”
The provost reviews all “material at the margin, even though the
recommendation is positive and everything that is a negative recommendation.” What the provost does is ask for further commentary, outside
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the institution if necessary, “and most often I do.” Disagreements with
recommendations occur “infrequently.” This low level of disagreement is
a result, in part, of the institution’s practice of reviewing “everyone who
has not been tenured annually prior to reappointment. And in the process of that annual review of everyone in the system, our concerns are
usually expressed in that context. . . . So when we get to the end of the
process, it’s highly unusual that there is a major disagreement because
we’ve raised the concerns as we go along.”
Like other institutions, Bureaucratic U tries “very hard to reach an
accommodation of different views early so that the faculty member is not
surprised by the judgment. . . .and has an opportunity to try to meet
those expectations so those are clarified.” And again, the desire is to
“have some assurance that there is a trajectory of scholarly activity.
Again, not always that they are going to be the Nobel laureate of the
future, but a solid record of scholarship. . .” But the provost also
stressed the importance of teaching: “The word here is ‘and,’ not ‘or.’ . . .
in good conscience we cannot tenure individuals who have shown that
they are not effective in the classroom.” She said that the “most significant disagreements come when an individual has a marginal teaching
record but a very good record of scholarship. And that is simply unacceptable.”
The general picture of upper administration agreement with departmental recommendations is similar at Collegial U, but with a somewhat different slant. The associate provost there commented that “I virtually never would disagree with a recommendation that was uniform up
to the point where it reaches my desk. Um,, the, um, the . . . a very small
percentage of the cases, maybe, you know, 5 percent of the cases maybe,

Chapter IV: Discussion and Analysis

88

that there is a difference from the departmental recommendation, but it’s
,. . . it would never be that I would say no if the department recommendation were yes; there would be a set of no’s up the line that would lead
to a negative decision. I would say that I virtually never would disagree
with a recommendation that was uniform up to the point where it
reaches my desk. What I’m judging is the sufficiency of the argumentation, the kind of weighing of the evidence for tenure or against tenure. . .
so I’m judging the weight of the evidence that’s presented and the arguments that are made on the basis of that evidence.” What reasons would
the provost at Collegial U have for disagreeing with a departmental and
college recommendation? Again, the same as we have seen at the other
institutions: a “lack of distinction of research [as well as] . . . the whole
range of factors, um, that the campus considers when deciding whether
to tenure someone or not.” This provost also noted that a candidate
could be denied tenure or promotion for poor teaching, indicating the
same philosophy of the importance of teaching as did Bureaucratic and
Shared-Governance universities. But at the same time, she was absolutely adamant about never making a judgment about the quality and
value of the work itself.

Role of the Chair of the Department or Division
Now that we have heard chairs discuss the promotion and tenure
process, we must ask what they themselves consider to be their special
or particular roles in this process. If we look carefully, we see that the
chair, at the bureaucratic as well as at the collegial enterprise, has a fair
amount of power, even if he or she does not, in effect, “control” the process. The chair appoints the ad hoc committees in every case where this
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type of committee exists. In other cases, the chair appoints the chair of
the P&T committee, or even serves on the P&T committee. In almost all
cases, the committee or committees write a report on each candidate
and, in most instances, the department discusses the report and votes
on whether or not to tenure or promote the candidate. In only two instances does the process bypass the department and involve only the
chair. But even when the department is responsible for voting, the chair
is responsible for writing a letter of recommendation that will accompany
the candidate’s dossier to the dean and college committee and subsequently to the associate provost and college committee. Although there
are universities at which the dean and college do not necessarily review
and approve departmental recommendations, that was not the case at
any of the universities in this study—in each of the universities in this
study, the dean and college committees receive dossiers or “books” from
the departments and pass them on to the university-level committee with
their own recommendations. The flow of influence can most logically be
represented by the following diagram with the boxes representing the
relative influence of each component:

Department

College

University

So, given their position, their responsibilities, and ultimately their
power, how do they see themselves in this position? We will examine
chair roles by institution rather than by discipline because, as several
mentioned, they do pay attention to what the institution says and tend to
guide their actions accordingly.
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At Shared-Governance U, the engineering chair says that “the
department here at Shared-Governance U in engineering can play a
significant role in the makeup of the faculty and in this promotion and
tenure process.” Thus, he holds discussions with faculty, organizes candidates for promotion and tenure each year, and talks with the P&T
committee. But “first and foremost, when I make a hire, I review the
promotion and tenure criteria both on my own mind in evaluating the
candidates and then with the candidates as they are considering their
role here.” Thus, the tenure and promotion wheels begin to turn before a
person is even hired. This practice is not unusual.
The chair of chemistry is responsible for writing a recommendation
to the dean and college. But even more than that, he appoints the ad hoc
subcommittees that review the candidate’s work each year. Although he
was of the opinion that there is no real gatekeeper, said that his recommendation, “the chair’s recommendation, carries more weight probably
with the dean and with the upper administration. . . . And in that respect
I can be the gatekeeper.”
The English department chair sees himself in a similar light: “On
one level I am a gatherer of evidence. It is my responsibility to determine
who will be contacted to provide expert testimony on the quality of faculty work, and it is my responsibility to gather accurate records of the
faculty member’s performance. . . . And I see it as my responsibility to
guarantee that peer review is done and that regular . . . reviews are done.
And at the same time, I need to be making my own judgments about the
quality of an individual faculty member’s contributions to the institution
because I see the faculty member’s evaluations. I also end up dealing
with any students who might come in to maybe praise the faculty mem-
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ber, to complain about the faculty member. . .. And so I see myself being
able to add to the procedures a fair amount of information . . ..” Recall
that this chair appoints the P&T committee members, appointments
which are ratified by the departmental executive committee on which he
serves.
In psychology, we see a much more egalitarian attitude. This chair
considers himself “as first among equals rather than an administrator
per se or an oligarch.” He notes that he is responsible for yearly reviews,
which faculty have the opportunity to read and rebut if they are so inclined. He also selects outside reviewers different from those named by
the candidate. He says he also is “an advocate for the department in
judging whether one coming up for promotion and tenure should be
promoted or tenured.” He commented that one person in the college had
said the “role of the chair is to promote the careers of people who hate
you. I don’t take that viewpoint.” Echoing the comment of the engineering
chair, he said that “the letter from the chair is the most important document in the dossier; it is critical.” So again, we have a chair who wields
tremendous power.
The engineering chair at Bureaucratic U takes a somewhat different approach. Although he is responsible for writing a letter of recommendation that becomes part of the candidate’s “book,” he considers his
primary responsibility “to make sure that the procedures are followed
carefully. . . . A second thing is to try to make sure that the faculty,
especially the younger faculty . . . understand their rights.” He placed his
review of the data and recommendation letter third in order.
The chemistry chair again has a different concept of his role, that
being “to make sure that the department is improving, that the vector is
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up in terms of quality.” This chair is not at all reluctant to use his power:
So it is not uncommon at all for there to be a majority positive vote on a
tenure decision and still have it turned down by the chair. In other
words, at the end of the day, the tenure and promotion committee and
also the full faculty are advisory to the chair.” Although it does not happen frequently that he would counter a promotion and tenure recommendation of the committee, “it certainly happens and it certainly has
happened.”
The psychology chair also feels it is his responsibility “to develop a
strong faculty.” The faculty recommends to him, “so the bottom line is
that I have to make the decision about whether to recommend tenure
and promotion or not,” but the “ultimate responsibility” is his. Additionally, he commented that he had not “had any recommendation refused in
the 16 years that I’ve been chair. So it serves . . . it also increases the
credibility of the chair. So, if there is ever a case where it’s, you know, I
have not the strongest case in the world, I can put more muscle behind
the argument.” He also said that “the history is pretty much that the
chair listens to the faculty,” but the suggestion is that the chair always
has the right not to listen to the faculty.
As for the chair of English, he has several points that he considers
his special role in the P&T process. First is assuring consistency, both as
applied to candidates for promotion to the same rank and “between this
year’s recommendations and those of previous years.” He cautioned, “I
am not using the word uniform, by the way.” And, since the recommendations are not uniform, “standards today cannot be the same as we had
20 years ago. . . . The university is asking more, rather than the same or
less than it once had.” He also, as the chair of psychology noted, is not
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bound by the recommendations of the faculty committee; but the chair
“is responsible as an individual [for recommendations either pro or con]”
for recommendations which he must put in writing. As he explained, if a
faculty member files a grievance, it is against him, not the university.
At Collegial U, the chair of English felt his special role in the promotion and tenure process was essentially being an advocate for the
department to the upper level decision-makers: “he would try to make
the best case he can for the candidate based on the reports that are . . .
the best case he can for the department’s decision so that, you know,
given those reports that were given, and the department then finally
votes in favor, the chair will, trying to be honest of course, will present
the materials in such a way as to justify that decision.” If the chair “feels
very strongly against the vote [of the department], “she is asked . . . not
asked but invited, to write a separate letter of her or his own opinion.”
In the engineering department, the chair’s role is to “essentially
just orchestrate the thing through until the faculty votes.” He also considers himself a mentor, even though the department formally appoints
“a specific faculty member mentor for every junior faculty member. . . .
But of course they often come to me and ask for my advice on those
things in addition to that mentor. You know, I have an open door for
that.” Then, after the department votes, the chair prepares the departmental recommendation for the dean: “And then actually, uh, sit down
and write up the case for the department, the recommendation, which
has in it . . . which I choose exactly what level will be recommended for
the person based on my assessment of the strength of the case.”
The chair of psychology says his primary role is “to make an honest evaluation and to support that evaluation. If I think that person war-
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rants an advancement or promotion, then it’s my obligation as the chair
of the department to make the best case possible as to why the university should reward that individual.” Once again, we see the idea that the
chair is an advocate for the department’s decision or wishes while also
constructing and justifying an independent evaluation.
Role of Chief Academic Officer
It is clear that some provosts and associate provosts, vice presidents,
chancellors and presidents consider themselves leaders and trendsetters.
At the same time, they place responsibility for promotion and tenure
decisions in the department. It is instructive to examine how they view
their role in the institution and how they view their responsibilities
in the promotion and tenure process. It is equally clear that the two
roles are related, although this study was not designed to examine that
relationship.
Associate provosts and provosts also consider themselves guides,
guardians, and informants. They hold orientations, “go very carefully
through what the cases should look like for merit advancement and for
promotion, and hold meetings with assistant professors (Collegial U). As
for the kind of leadership role they play, “it is a very important one. Um,
but it’s not that it is not influenced by faculty. I don’t think anyone could
be in either my position or the [provost’s] and decide on a set of institutional goals that weren’t ones that the faculty was . . . fully saw the kind
of urgency and value of. . . .with my knowledge of the institution, trying
to decide what is most important for it to pursue and then persuade
faculty that that is the most important thing to pursue.” It thus appears
that the provost and associate provost believe they have wide and com-
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prehensive knowledge of the institution and where it should be going and
try to set those objectives. But it is equally clear that no one is going
anywhere without the knowledge and concurrence of the faculty.
At Bureaucratic U, the associate provost sees himself as “playing a
very active role with the provost and the president and our legal affairs
staff on issues of policy and procedures.” But like the associate provost
at Collegial U, he conducts meetings “with faculty about particular issues, policies, problems, . . .” and “works with chairs and directors who
have issues and concerns about faculty behavior or particular policies
and procedures they’re going to develop. . .” But of greatest importance
seems to be the “enormous amount of effort in say the last five to eight
years on really getting a very strong base of support in the faculty development arena, teaching improvement and effectiveness being a major
dimension there.” He also sees himself as “a major questioner, um, a
commentator in dialogue with the dean . . .” The provost was even more
positive about the necessity of being a leader with support from the faculty: “. . . I work very hard not to be out there by myself. . . because my
ability to implement it at department X when I can’t look at all the vitas
and sit in on their discussions depends on my getting some buy-in. So it
does require me to lay out . . . to use a different analogy, you know, I’ve
got to lay out the parade route because that is what people believe that
provosts should do.” Her “special role is to try to be out in front of the
process talking to faculty, deans and others and trying to get for the
community a level of expectation that narrows the gap between our
rhetoric and what actually happens.” She stressed the importance of not
just helping to “frame the parade route,” but making “sure that the gap
between the front of the parade and the rest of it is very small.”

Chapter IV: Discussion and Analysis

96

At Shared-Governance U on the other hand, we can perceive much
more of a top-down approach. The associate provost’s special role is to
make the promotion and tenure process “more equitable across campus .
. . So we are more interested in interpretation—how the guidelines are
implemented and kind of making sure there is equity between the different units and that the same guidelines are being used and interpreted
the same way.” He thinks the institution “is characterized by relatively
low walls between units in terms of many of our academic units. . .. In
other areas, I think there are a lot of turf issues and walls, people working in their own silos.”
He says faculty are involved in all decisions, academic policies “are
run by the academic deans. . . . Work groups that deal with different
issues . . . usually have faculty representation.” Note that he said “usually,” which suggests that faculty are not always involved. Although
“programs are initiated by faculty or units that come up with good ideas
as opposed from a lot of top-down kinds of stuff,” the administration has
“identified areas that we would like some initiative.” When this occurs,
the administration makes funds available and “kind of go with an RFP
process where people will send in proposals and define initiative areas
and compete for some of the funds to do these things. But this way we
define essentially what areas we need help in or would like initiative in
and some of the ground work in that exact program and how it may be
accomplished.”
In the past, he said that the administration essentially decided
what programs to initiate but now is requesting more action from the
faculty. But, it is noteworthy that he said, “Not every program can be
operated that way. In some cases, that is not an effective way.” When
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asked how it was decided to revise the university promotion and tenure
guidelines, he said that it “was primarily a faculty-led initiative.”
The provost corroborated this idea that the faculty initiate changes
in curricular matters: “Certainly faculty have been key and have driven
changes like the development of the baccalaureate core. . .” Changes in
academic programs are also originated “by and large” by faculty. Yet
other changes have been “driven by the initiative of the president appointing one person to do a study and bring the results back and the
president making a series of decisions.” This president is “very much a
change activist in identifying a whole series of things he would like to see
the university respond to and some changes in directions.” Although the
faculty “ultimately become involved in the discussion and consideration
and obviously any implementation, . . . the initiation of those certainly is
not in the faculty.” So, although Shared-Governance U does involve the
faculty in the construction and implementation of new programs and
does make some effort to create Shared-Governance U’s “buy-in” situation, it appears that the administration here is much more apt to make
decisions on its own.

Goals
Considering what the chairs say is their role in the promotion and
tenure process, we have an emerging picture of the department that is
much more concerned with itself as an individual and separate entity
than we might have presumed. It is part of the institution and in many
cases looks to the institution for guidance in the criteria for promotion
and tenure. It is part of the national and international discipline and
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looks to peers outside of the institution for evaluation and judgment. But
it appears to be undertaking these actions with a view to self-aggrandizement and within-institution, individual power. The most prominent goal
of each department seems to be reputation and scholastic excellence, but
it is reputation that gives it power. Can we interpret this to mean that
departments are participating in a zero-sum game to the extent that
whichever department has the greatest reputation will gain for itself
more institutional funds and more positions—to the exclusion of other
departments? Or is it a simple matter of horizontal competition for recognition without regard for competition for resources? Or is it a need to
justify its programs and positions to just maintain them? These are
questions that need answers—especially with respect to how much a
department’s reputation benefits it within the institution.
At Collegial U, the English department clearly seeks people who
“are among the most extraordinary people in the country . . . who are
going to be leaders in the profession. . . . one thing that does count is
that notion of superior intellectual attainment.” The engineering department also says, “And, um, what we look for is the best. . . .we hope that
we’re hiring the best. And we are, we do feel fortunate in that we almost
always get our person. I mean the top person that we in our search, the
person that we go after, we almost always get that person.” The psychology department hedged, but he also said the department sought faculty
who are “outstanding in the areas of research, teaching and university
and professional service.” Because of the way this chair hedged his answers and in one instance even backpedaled, his statement here has the
ring of a canned speech and is much less believable as a valid opinion
than the other two.
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The chair of engineering at Bureaucratic U noted that some
changes had occurred over the past few years, bringing “our standards
into a good alignment in the college as a whole, and so it’s become a
more serious decision [tenure].” He adds that the department is “hard on
ourselves, feeling it’s better to be hard on ourselves and then be able to
argue effectively than sort of cast it out there and hope.” So here is a
department that holds itself to some “higher” standard so that it can put
itself in a position to get what it wants when that is necessary.
The chemistry chair says his department has “consensus in terms
of what we are looking for.” And what they are looking for is “originality, .
. . recognition, . . . evidence of peer review, . . . funding.” The P&T committee chair added that another “issue is whether the research that’s
being done is of a form that is likely to be. . .continue to be successful in
the future.”
In the psychology department, the chair said rather straightforwardly that one issue in making very strong recommendations that “are
a notch or so above the other units that are in the college” is “to increase
the reputation of the department.” This department is specifically seeking “somebody who is going to be a solid teacher of undergraduates and
graduate students, . . . somebody who is going to contribute to the discipline, . . . [and] a colleague who is carrying their weight in terms of other
departmental responsibilities. . .”—the teaching, research and service
triumvirate? Is this department, therefore, looking around at other disciplines to see what other fields are doing and guiding its promotion and
tenure criteria accordingly?
This picture is very different from that described by either Biglan
or Alpert. And, although this is a single instance, there is a suggestion,
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however tenuous, that other departments at other universities are looking around to see what other departments are doing about tenure and
promotion—either to see what they can get by with or to see what they
have to do to be that “one notch or so above.” The English department
chair admitted that “As a whole, to be candid, we are a department that,
over the 30 years I have been here, has tended to ask too little rather
than too much.” But despite this failing, he says, “we are always looking
for breakthrough stuff, all right, and on the assumption that one can
recognize breakthrough stuff when one sees it, yes.”
At Shared-Governance U, the engineering chair provided the
sweeping statement that his department’s goals are to tenure and promote individuals with “solid contributions in essentially all of the areas
and excellence in teaching or research and scholarship.” The P&T committee chair said that “the objective here is to make sure that the department increases its stature and the quality of the student increases.”
Although he was the only one to mention student quality, it is a response
that indicates acknowledgment (if only a philosophical acknowledgment)
of the relationship of research to instruction and students at every level.
The chemistry chair also says, “We want to have someone who
makes a solid contribution to the department in certainly in the areas of
teaching and research. . . . We would like to have someone who can
really help make our reputation in the area of scholarship. I think that is
very important to us, and that’s why the outside letters make such a
difference.” Again, “solid contribution,” but more, a concern over reputation. And one gets the impression it is not just the national reputation,
but the national reputation as it increases the departmental reputation
within the institution.
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The English department seeks “effective teachers . . . and productive scholars who are producing work that is of high quality and that
they are participating in and making contributions to the profession.”
The P&T committee chair was somewhat more specific, noting “we want
evidence of good teaching. We want evidence of reasonable contributions
with the promise of significant contributions in scholarship. We do not
expect our people to be leading, brilliant scolars in the fields just in order
to get tenure.” This was a rather refreshing comment—admitting that not
everyone can be “the best in their field.”
The psychology chair was even more forthright in his recognition
that “officially, the expectation for research is the same as elsewhere, but
in practice we can get by with somewhat weaker credentials [because the
department is an undergraduate unit only and faculty have higher teaching loads].” His goals for tenure are also realistic: “competence and a
clear indication they are going to continue to perform competently. I
want people who will be scholars for the rest of their lives. I want people
who like what they do.” Again, a refreshing departure from the standard
mantra of “excellence,” “best in their field” and “superior quality.”
Note that, in my own interpretation of the interviews, the two most
candid interviewees were at Shared-Governance U, which is the only
institution for which there appeared to be hidden conflicts between the
administration and the departments. This may be further validation that,
indeed, some major conflicts exist there.
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Teaching, Research and Service
A similarity across all departments at all universities was the relationship of teaching to research in the tenure and promotion evaluation and
their relative weight with respect to the third leg of the higher education
triumvirate—service. In each case, research and teaching were ranked
equal or within a few percentage points (15 was the maximum) of each
other with service, variously defined, of much lower importance (ranging
from 5 to 15 percent of total effort). Collegial U defined two distinct
realms of service—service to the community and service to the profession, and, except for this dual definition, the nature of service appears to
be everywhere rather amorphous, ranging from serving on departmental
committees to serving on advisory and review boards to giving talks at
the local high school. A broad spectrum of activities appear to fit in the
service category—in fact, everything that cannot be comfortably classified
as either scholarship or teaching drops into the service basket.
The chemistry chair at Shared-Governance U says that “teaching
has certainly become much more important in the last . . . certainly
since I have been chair. I’ve been chair since 1984, and teaching has
increased in importance I would say nearly every year. . . . [I]f there are
problems in the teaching area, then it’s not so certain that everything is
going to go well.” He said that “good teaching can tip the balance” in
promotion from associate to full professor, although “where tenure is
involved, that becomes more problematic. . . . but . . . we even had really
outstanding teaching make a difference.” He says teaching “may be 40
percent—45 percent—and scholarship about the same,” but “service [is]
much less.” The English department chair said essentially the same
thing: “. . .a faculty member who was not teaching effectively would have
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trouble being tenured . . . and a problematic record in teaching would be
something that would be problematic for promotion and tenure.” The
P&T committee chair was of the opinion that “teaching and scholarship
are equally important, both of them more important than service.” The
P&T committee chair in engineering thought that “people realized they
were losing some excellent teachers, and I think people started to realize
that, if you’re a land-grant college, a land-grant university, perhaps the
main emphasis should be on educating a large mass of undergraduate
students instead of spending an awful lot of time and funds and attention on the graduate programs.” But, despite the attention to teaching
undergraduates, he was of the opinion that “research is important, and
research, if properly pursued, makes a better teacher out of a person.” In
psychology, the chair was of a similar opinion: “Research and teaching
are about equal weight in actual practice.” However, since his personal
opinion was somewhat at variance with that assessment, he “would give
research a 4, teaching a 3 and 1 or less for service. . . . We have a higher
research expectation than other schools with the same teaching loads.”
Only two chairs answered the question of the relative importance
or weight of teaching and research at Bureaucratic U, but these are
similar to what we have seen at Shared-Governance U. In fact, not only
mechanical engineering, but all of the engineering college “allocate[s]
effort at the level of 45 percent for teaching, 45 percent for research and
10 percent for service unless specific arrangements are made to do something different from that.” The P&T committee chair noted, as did the
engineering P&T chair and the chemistry chair at Shared-Governance U,
that the weighting between teaching and research “has moved in the
direction of becoming co-equal. . .equal.” He also commented that the
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college has a student-initiated teaching award which “has been won
every year for the last 16 by research-active faculty. . . . Faculty members with . . . the poorest teaching records tend to also have the poorest
research records. . . . I think the feeling amongst the faculty members in
the department is that the two really do go hand in hand and are mutually supportive.”
The psychology chair also noted that a “contribution to knowledge
is very important to keep the discipline moving forward, and if you like,
to improve the quality of our teaching. If we stop doing that, I think we’re
in big trouble. . . . Teaching is kind of a necessary but not sufficient
condition for tenure or promotion.” Even at the “high status,” Collegial
U, teaching is an essential adjunct to research: “[the university] probably
wouldn’t promote a brilliant teacher who had a weak research record,
but it certainly might not promote a person with a good research record
who wasn’t a good teacher,” said the English chair. He was of the opinion
that “teaching is very close to it [research]. But I would say, let’s see, um,
put it 55, 40 and 5 for that.”
The chair of engineering said the relative importance of teaching
and research is “different than it was 20 years ago, but this is what I
believe is the case right now—I believe that teaching and research are
just about equal in weight. . . . One would not be able to promote to
tenure a faculty member who was not getting good teaching evaluations.”
He added that “it used to be possible to advance with horrible teaching,
but now I would say that the only cases that I put forward, the only
cases that I can recall that I put forward that were not successful as I
had recommended them were due to perceived shortfalls in the teaching
component.” If he “had to put a percentage on things,” he would place it
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“about 45 percent teaching and about 45 percent research and about 10
percent service.” And although he admitted that there “are some problems with that [evaluatng teaching], of course, a person absolutely cannot advance now without good teaching.” Making an even stronger statement, he was of the definite opinion that there is an “entirely overwhelming relationship” between teaching and research: “I mean, we don’t have
people who don’t do research and we don’t have people who don’t teach.”
He added that, “except possibly in introductory courses, there’s not a
real clear line between them.”
When asked the question about the relative importance of research
and teaching, the psychology chair stated that research, teaching and
service “are all important, all equally important.” But when asked about
the relationship of teaching to research for the university as a whole, he
said, “Yes, I would say research and teaching, I’m not sure about the
service. And I would also back off in my department.”
University-level administrators were also all of the opinion (or so
they all said) that research is important to teaching but that good teaching is an essential component for tenure and promotion.
At Shared-Governance U, the provost said that “those involved . . .
in research and discovery bring those insights and the cutting-edge kind
of understanding of a field into the classroom, into the teaching.” Interestingly enough, this university has just revised its general promotion
and tenure guidelines, in the process of which there was evidently a
concerted effort to “try to reduce the emphasis on only original research
as what would be acknowledged or credited.” The associate provost said
“it varies a lot on who you talk to, I guess,” but he did think that scholarship “does in fact make a faculty member a more well rounded and a
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better. . .to better function in other assignments like in teaching or in
extended education, conference consulting, whatever.” He also said that
with the new guidelines the university is “moving away from” the attitude
“that if you are not a researcher, you are a second-class or that kind of
issue.”
The same philosophy of the connection between research and
teaching is in evidence at Bureaucratic U. The provost was firm in
saying that “it is important as we look at who is an effective faculty
member, we recognize that not everyone is going to do. . .to do uh. . .
sort of original work throughout his or her career, But it is important
to synthesize and to put new spin on the work of others and to transmit
that into teaching so we are teaching cutting-edge concepts and are
using in [sic] cutting edge concepts even in Arts and Humanities to be
sure that we using the most recent critiques, the most recent ways of
thinking about canon so that students are exposed to the intellectual
creativity of various scholars.”
Additionally, “I think that there is a strong sort of symbiotic relationship between research and teaching. And what we have talked about
here is an expectation that all of our faculty are research active and
student centered. Emphasizing the ‘and,’ not the ‘or.’” When asked what
student centered means, she explained that “It means, in our sense,
being concerned about not only being a good teacher in a technical
sense, but being concerned about the student as a learner and a partner
in learning.” The associate provost was of the same bent, believing that
“the scholarly activity is the stock of knowledge that one imparts to students and that the vitality and quality of the instructional process are
not going to be animated in terms of new ideas, new perspectives, unless

Chapter IV: Discussion and Analysis

107

there is an active scholarly base that is very closely connected with the
teaching activity.” He did note that there are “different perspectives [and]
. . . some variable opinion” concerning the relationship of the two activities. He also noted that a question of time commitment often arises,
which promotes the idea that “the research and scholarly activity is
competitive with time and effort devoted to teaching and outreach. So in
that sense there would be some argument about whether these are close
coupling or whether as a time dimension they are competitive.” The other
question that frequently arises is one of rewards and, “although changing, I think fairly rapidly in recent years, that the research and scholarly
record . . . is the coin of the realm, the only thing that really counts. And
so in that sense, that reinforces those activities at the expense of others.”
The associate provost at Collegial U said that the people at that
institution feel “that excellent research leads to excellent teaching, that
one’s research informs one’s teaching and that it’s a way of bringing both
graduate and undergraduate students into the research community.”
This is so much more of the same in words that we have seen elsewhere.
The only person who expressed a quite different view was the chair of the
university level, faculty review committee at Collegial U. He was of the
personal opinion that research and teaching are not related: “I view the
teaching as independent.” But then he said that “there’s a skill in teaching in which you are engaged with cutting-edge material because of your
research that you couldn’t if you weren’t doing cutting-edge research.” In
the final analysis, he thought that “there probably is a relationship,
although I imagine it’s a weak one.”
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Summary of Findings
With respect to the initial research questions, we have some answers to
the eight research questions of phases I and II:
Phase I
1.

To what extent does structure vary with respect to size,

geographic location, history, cultural milieu, stated goals, level of operational control, and external funding in different institutions?
2.

To what extent do goals vary with respect to size, geographic

location, history, cultural milieu, and external funding in different institutions?
3.

To what extent do operations and level of centralized control

vary with respect to size, geographic location, history, cultural milieu,
mission and goals, and external funding in different institutions?

Because of the nature of the findings, we will answer all three of
these questions at one time. According to the statistical analysis of demographic data for all 31 state, land-grant enterprises for which usable
data exists, there is no significant relationship either among the demographics or between various demographic data and goals, structure or
operations. As we can see from examining the charts of mean values (see
Appendix E), the means are all quite close. There is no significant difference, so no significant, meaningful correlation between or among these
data. Structure, goals and operations do not depend on and are not
statistically significantly related to, size, cultural milieu, history (founding date), external funding, administrative hierarchy or level of operational control, geographic location (size of local town, commuting popula-

Chapter IV: Discussion and Analysis

109

tion, region of the country), or student body make-up (numbers of graduates and undergraduates).
Phase II
There are five questions in Phase II. I will discuss the major findings
related to each one.

1. To what extent are the enterprise and departmental authority
structures congruent?
Discussion of promotion and tenure (or review) committee structures (see Table 6, page 44) indicates little, if any, relationship to the
authority structure as indicated by content analysis of faculty handbooks. Committees in all departments interviewed at Collegial U are ad
hoc, appointed by the chair. Committees at the other two enterprises are
constituted in a number of ways. Committees may be appointed or
elected, with variations within that structure such as an elected chair
who appoints the committee, or an elected committee with one member
appointed by the department chair. What is most striking in these ar rangements is the lack of pattern. Even at Collegial U, where all committees are ad hoc, two report to a subset of the department while one reports to the chair and the department. We might conclude that the structure adopted by any given department is randomly chosen. As discussed
earlier, however, it would be logical that faculty coming from other enterprises would bring their own experiences with them and infuse their new
department with new ideas and new ways of conducting departmental
duties and responsibilities.
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2. To what extent are the operations of the enterprise and the department congruent?
With respect to the operation of promotion and tenure committees,
most report, for decisions on recommendations for tenure or promotion,
to a subset of the department, while one (psychology at Shared-Gover nance U) reports to the department as a whole, including nontenured
assistant professors. Review committees at Collegial U generally report to
the departmental faculty who are at or above the rank the candidate is
applying for; although, in one case the review committee sends separate
reports to both the chair and the faculty.
Voting also has many formats, none of which depend on either the
departmental operations or the enterprise. In some cases the faculty
making the recommendation decision vote by secret ballot, but most vote
openly in a meeting. In one case faculty vote by e-mail if they are not on
campus. As we have seen, some departments have “an oral tradition” of
requiring a two-thirds or three-fourths vote of approval for a recommendation to pass beyond the department to the next level of review. But,
that chair noted that university requirements stipulate that if a candidate wants the dossier “to go forward,” the department must send it on
(Shared-Governance U).
The English chair at Collegial U noted that a two-thirds majority
vote is necessary in that department, but not in others on campus, for a
recommendation to carry. “If there is a discrepancy of one vote either
way, there’s an immediate re-vote, and that vote is final.” This department also does not allow e-mail voting, although letters are accepted and
read to the tenure staff—“You can’t vote if you’re not at the discussion.”
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We have also seen that at least one department requires external
funding for award of tenure; and, as we have also seen, this stipulation
apparently is a direct contradiction of institutional “policy.” Thus, we
might now say that the operation of the enterprise has little bearing on
the operation at the departmental level. There simply is too much variation and a decided lack of pattern, much as we saw when we examined
the congruence of structure at the enterprise and departmental levels.
One universal factor in the operations of the review of research is
the reliance on external peer reviews. Without exception, such reviews
are required for tenure, though not always for promotion. The enterprise
here often stipulates a minimum number of outside letters (see Table 5,
page 33). The department, however, is at liberty to request much more
(one chair said that they normally send out ten letters requesting external review and often get six or seven back). The important thing here,
however, is that peer review is a universal requirement, and so is unrelated to the classification of the enterprise.

3. To what extent are the goals of the enterprise and the department
congruent?
Totally at variance with the lack of congruence between enterprise
and department with respect to structure and operation is the rather
complete match between the two levels with respect to goals. But, note
that all enterprises and all departments are similar in this respect. All
say they want the best, the most outstanding, the most recognized, the
ones with “sustainable research programs,” excellence in research and
teaching. Goals, thus, are universal, with no discernable differences at
any enterprise or within any department.
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What are the most important relationships and interactions

between the enterprise and the department with respect to structure, goals
and operations?
Examining the relationships and interactions between enterprise
and department, we find, as noted above, that the most important is the
requirement of external peer review and the desire to promote and tenure
the absolute best (and it is normally stated in terms of promoting and
tenuring only the “best,” not the “best available.” The relationship between enterprise and department or department is almost nonexistent
with respect to structure and so universal with respect to goals that it
becomes an almost meaningless comparison. It is only with respect to
operation that there appears to be an important relationship. This is
particularly noticeable at Bureaucratic U, where the enterprise wants to
see peer reviews from scholars at its “peer institutions.” Department
chairs here were unanimous in their adherence to this stricture—one
chair noting that he would not want to send up a dossier that did not
have at least one letter from someone at an institution on the list of
desired peer institutions.

5.

How do the actors in this process perceive their relationship to

the discipline? to the institution? [The interview question was intended to
elicit information on the clash of values, authority structures, even goals
within the departments themselves; it was only partially successful, although it did yield some interesting suggestions.]
Of special interest is how some of the actors in the review of promotion perceive their relationships to the enterprise, to the department,
and to the discipline. Some are wholly independent actors who see little
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relationship between what they want in their department and what the
enterprise wants. One department at Shared-Governance U appears to
follow its own path quietly, while another at that same enterprise railed
against the restrictions placed on it. But, most chairs said they and their
departments were looked upon favorably by the enterprise and had little
or no conflict with it. Hints of conflict with respect to affirmative action
appointments appeared when one chair noted that a departed faculty
member would have been awarded tenure by the enterprise against the
wishes of the department.
Noteworthy was the statement by all chairs, even the ones who
hinted at conflict, that almost all recommendations of the department
during the past five or six years have been approved by the enterprise.
Chief academic officers mirrored this level of agreement when they said
they overturn departmental recommendations in only about 5 percent of
the cases sent to them, and those only when there was disagreement
between departmental and college recommendations.
Knowledge of how and under what guidelines other disciplines
evaluate research within the same enterprise appear to be almost wholly
lacking. That was not a concern of the chairs and committee chairs interviewed. What was a concern was how they and their faculty are per ceived by members of their own disciplinary members at other institutions. They pay attention to what others, outside of the local enterprise,
are saying and doing. It might be logical to presume that this is so because of the general assumption that the opinions of members of their
own profession are those opinions that establish the national and international reputations of their department and thus have a direct bearing
on their own professional lives.
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As we shall see in Chapter V, this apparent clash of values within
the enterprise has implications for understanding the nature of the enterprise.
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Table 7:

Outline of Promotion and Tenure Committee Structure and
Function at Bureaucratic U

Mechanical Engineering
1.
elected promotion committee (six members)
2.
appointed three-person subcommittee reviews
candidate
3.
promotion committee report sent to chair
4.
candidate can replace on member of review
subcommittee
5.
candidate can make statement
English
1.

2.
3.
4.
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Policy committee of six members (one untenured
serving one-year term and five tenured serving
staggered two-year terms) elected by department
P&T subcommittee for each candidate
P&T subcommittee recommends to Policy Committee
Policy Committee recommends to chair

Chemistry
1.
P&T committee elected, one person from each of
four areas of chemistry
2.
only tenured faculty on committee
3.
chair of department appoints committee chair
4.
recommendations brought to entire department in
“full faculty meeting”
Psychology
1.
three to four member subcommittee (only fact
gatherers)
2.
conflict in department over time spent discussing
candidates
3.
voting faculty (rank at or above) discuss and vote
4.
secret ballot
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Table 8:

Outline of Promotion and Tenure Committee Structure and
Function at Shared-Governance U

Mechanical Engineering
1.
elected committee
2.
committee recommends to chair concerning whether
or not to send candidate forward
3.
chair involved in committee discussions
4.
candidate decides to proceed
5.
chair usually agrees with committee
6.
candidate meets with committee
English
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

appointed committee
recommends to chair
students on committee to recommend on teaching
executive committee (nine members, department
chair plus two from each rank, one elected at
large and one elected from within rank) ratifies
chair appointments to P&T committee
secret ballot in committee
candidate can respond to committee and chair in
writing (response goes in dossier)

Chemistry
1.
ad hoc committee, different each year
2.
appointed by chair
3.
subcommittee sends review to voting members of
department
4.
document goes to candidate for review and
discussion
5.
voting department members can amend subcommittee
report
Psychology
1.
2.
3.
4.
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committee chair elected
committee chair appoints committee members
voting members of department
anyone can comment
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Table 9:

Outline of Promotion and Tenure Committee Structure and
Function at Collegial U

Mechanical Engineering
1.
appointed ad hoc committee
2.
related to person’s area (two person in, one
outside)
3.
report in faculty meeting
4.
faculty votes (secret ballot)
5.
final report written for university-level
committee
English
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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appointed ad hoc committee
five substantive internal evaluations which are
initially anonymous and then revealed
report to tenure staff
candidate may comment or rebut
tenure staff votes

Chemistry
declined to be interviewed
Psychology
1.
ad hoc appointed committee (two people)
2.
one person in area, one in related area
3.
formal written evaluation submitted to chair
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Chapter V

Conclusions
Background
As noted in the introduction, promotion and tenure decisions represent a major investment and have far-reaching repercussions for individual
departments and for the entire enterprise. Because of the general assumption that academic reputations hinge on the reputations of individual faculty, it is important to examine how and why those decisions are made.
Clearly, as Burton Clark said, departments and enterprise are intertwined
in making those decisions, and this dissertation has answered Clark’s
challenge to begin to examine those relationships—in authority structures,
operations and goals at both institutional and departmental levels. Alpert
and Keohane began to answer Clark’s questions, but both attempted to
develop a useful and functional model of the enterprise based on
overarching perceptions rather than by examining the characteristics of
structures, operations and goals of the enterprise and of the departments
and how they are congruent and interact at those two levels.
Since the primary goal of most enterprises is to tenure and promote
the “best” faculty, this dissertation set out to develop an understanding
of the factors that enter into the decisions to promote and tenure and how
the enterprise and department interact in making those decisions. The set
of questions developed for this research were aimed at increasing our understanding of the characteristics of the review of research in the tenure
and promotion process and an understanding of the congruency between
the enterprise and its departments.
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Phase I
To begin this characterization, a content analysis of the faculty
handbooks from 31 state, land-grant, Research I and Research II enterprises (six of which are Carnegie Research II and 25 Research I) was completed. On the basis of the involvement of committees and chairs at the
departmental, college, and institutional levels, each enterprise was categorized into one of three authority structures: bureaucratic, shared-governance or collegial.
Of the 25 Research I enterprises, four are bureaucratic, three collegial and 18 shared-governance.
This phase of the study also required the collection of demographic
data about each enterprise. This data included the size of the student body
and its mix of undergraduate and graduate students, student-faculty ratios, the number of upper administrators (deans and vice presidents),
number of volumes in the library, library budgets, research expenditures,
date of founding, geographic region (North, South, Midwest, Mid-Atlantic,
etc.), population of surrounding community and commuting population,
number of faculty, tenure densities, and full-time vs. part-time faculty.
Statistical analysis of these data was conducted to answer the three questions below. Statistical consulting ws provided by Magdalena Bugaj of the
Department of Statistics.
1.

To what extent does structure vary with respect to size, geo-

graphic location, history, cultural milieu, stated goals, level of operational
control, and external funding in different institutions?
2.

To what extent do goals vary with respect to size,

geographic location, history, cultural milieu, and external funding
in different institutions?
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To what extent do operations and level of centralized control

vary with respect to size, geographic location, history, cultural milieu, mission and goals, and external funding in different institutions?
The results of this analysis show no statistically significant relationships at any level in any category. We corrected for the extremely small cell
size to tease out relationships between demographic information and the
authority structure, operations and goals and still found no correlation. A
visual inspection of the graphs of means in the demographic categories
with the most complete data (see Appendix E), we saw that the means are
all quite close, which is the reason we can show no statistically significant
relationships.
Phase II
This phase of the research comprised interviews with department
chairs, chairs of promotion and tenure or personnel committees, chief
academic officers and the administrator in charge of personnel matters.
Interviews at the department level were conducted in departments representing Biglan’s four major disciplinary divisions: basic-hard (chemistry),
basic soft (English), applied hard (engineering), and applied soft (psychology), omitting his life-nonlife categories.
The interview questions were aimed at developing enough understanding to answer the following five questions:
1. To what extent are the enterprise and departmental authority structures congruent?
2. To what extent are the goals of the enterprise and the department
congruent?
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To what extent are the operating procedures of the enterprise

and department congruent?
4.

What are the most important relationships and interactions

between the enterprise and the department with respect to structure, goals
and operations?
5.

How do the actors in this process perceive their relationship to

the enterprise? to the discipline outside of the enterprise? [This was intended to elicit information on the clash of values, authority structures,
even goals within the departments themselves.]

Structure
Having examined the structure of the departmental promotion and
tenure committees (where such exist) and how departments arrive at the
recommendations submitted to the university’s upper administration, what
can we say about the relationship of these structures and operations to
those of the university itself? What can we say about their relationships to
those of other departments in the same discipline at other institutions and
to other departments within the same institution? Is there congruence at
any level?
As we have seen, the structure of the departmental P&T committees
is highly variable, both within each enterprise and within each discipline,
regardless of university. It is perhaps noteworthy to realize that all ad hoc
committees are appointed by the chair, whereas most standing committees,
whether constituted yearly or not, are elected—in whole or in part—by the
members of the department. Note that the ad hoc structure is most com-
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mon at Collegial U (see Table 3); yet because ad hoc committee members
are appointed by the chair, we might construe this to be the most bureaucratic of structures.
Additionally, although most committees, whether ad hoc or elected,
report to the department (eight of the 11 for which I have interviews), some
report to the chair (and in one case to the chair and to the department).
Except in that one case (the engineering department at Collegial U), reporting to the chair or reporting to the department are mutually exclusive. In
most cases, also, the committees are essentially “fact-finding” committees;
it is the department members (who are at or above the rank the candidate
is going to) who examine the “facts in the case” and actually recommend
whether or not to promote the candidate. Thus, the decision to recommend
a candidate for promotion or tenure appears to be truly a collegial one, not
dependent on either enterprise or discipline but rather appears to be a
function of the concept of professionalism (variously defined in the literature, but always including the idea that members of the profession determine its own membership and criteria for membership).
But what is “full membership” in the profession? Even that varies,
with a subset of faculty voting on promotion and tenure in all departments
except one, and this one, in which all faculty in the department have a vote
on promotion and tenure, is at Shared-Governance U. Interestingly
enough, the collegial institution allows only the subset, not the entire department, to vote on these personnel issues. So, we can conclude that
collegiality as a departmental organizational structure is circumscribed
under certain conditions. As to what those conditions might be, there appears to be no pattern, either within institutions or within disciplinary
areas. This finding does not seem to fit any established organizational
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theory, including Biglan’s theory of disciplinary differences, and directly
contradicts Alpert’s matrix model.
In addition, let us note that some departmental structures, even
though the department members have a voice in elections, are so construed as to leave, on close examination, a great deal of power in the hands
of the department chair. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the
English department at Shared-Governance U. Recall that here the chair
appoints the P&T committee, which appointments are ratified by an elected
departmental “policy committee.” But, and this is an important point, the
department chair serves on the Policy Committee. The P&T committee then
sends its recommendations to the chair. Also at Shared-Governance U, the
engineering department committee forwards its recommendations to the
chair; but here the committee is elected. We find that same pattern at
Bureaucratic U in both the English and engineering departments.
What does this tell us about the relationship of the institutional
structure to the departmental P&T structure? It suggests that the institutional structure does not really have an impact on how the department
structures its internal affairs. Additionally, given the fact that the departments we are dealing with here are English (soft, pure) and engineering
(hard, applied), we would be hard pressed to find two more philosophically
disparate disciplines. Yet they use the same structural arrangement.
Further, this surprising discovery suggests that the efforts to construct a
model that will “describe” institutions of higher education are doomed to
failure. All of the models have some validity, but they all fail to provide a
complete snapshot of the organization called higher education. Pieces of
each model hold for portions of different institutions.
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Perhaps, rather than seeking a single model, we should be seeking
traits that can help us determine which parts of which model to use in
certain situations, or characteristics of universities that can help us determine what these institutions do best or how they behave academically.
But even there, the variability we are seeing both within institutions and
within disciplines across institutions suggests that (at least for promotion
and tenure issues), we are going to fail to find one model that will hold
everywhere.
Before leaving discussion of structure behind, let us look at the one
concept that appeared to be a unifying idea: shared governance. We have
seen that university administrations are loathe to go counter to the wishes
of the department in academic matters (or they say they are). This is part
and parcel of the idea of shared governance in which the department
handles academic matters and the university administration takes care of
nonacademic matters.
Evidence of the value of shared governance is particularly prominent
when we look at the collegial institution in this study. This institution is
one of only three land-grant universities in the initial set of 35 institutions
with what appears to be faculty control over promotion and tenure decisions—in which the faculty handbook states that decisions “may” involve
members of the upper administration (provost and president). This is also
an institution in which all upper administrators are active members of
their disciplinary departments. Although the chief academic officer recommends personnel actions to the president of the university, there is a
universitywide committee of faculty who evaluate promotion dossiers and
recommend action to the chief academic officer. When asked, this officer
said that there would have to be a truly compelling reason to abrogate the
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recommendation of the university committee. Yet, despite this evidence of
faculty control of the institution, two interviewees noted that their institution was the epitome of shared governance in higher education.
The only other facet of the structure of P&T committees that is truly
congruent across all systems is the ad hoc vs. standing committee structure: ad hoc committees in this study were uniformly appointed, while
standing committees all have elected members (in only one case was only
one member elected.).
Thus, we find that Biglan’s disciplinary differences do not carry into
the P&T structure. Additionally, Alpert’s matrix model does not seem to
have validity in this situation either.

Operation
The interviews suggested that the more active the faculty are in the
institutional decision-making process and the more active they are as
scholars in their own field, the stronger the institution appears to be academically and the higher its academic standards and reputational ranking.
(In the last two U.S. News & World Report issues dealing with university
rankings, both Collegial U and Bureaucratic U were in the top 100 of the
first tier; Shared-Governance U was in the middle of the pack in the second
tier.) The relationship of faculty involvement in institutional governance
with reputational rankings and the individual faculty record of scholarship
needs to be tested.
The corollary to this is the weaker the faculty are as academics, the
more powerful is the central administration and the more prominent are
factors other than scholarship in promotion and tenure decisions. Associ-
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ated with this dichotomy is the level of dissatisfaction and unhappiness,
which appears to be highest at the bureaucratic institution and lowest
at the collegial one. At the enterprise categorized in this study as
shared-governance, one chair expressed clear unhappiness at the level
of control by the state and administration over academic matters such
as curriculum.
At that same university, one chair said that an unwritten rule in his
department was that faculty would not be tenured unless they had external funding for their research. When asked about the importance of external funding, the provost stated categorically that external funding was not
an essential element for either tenure or promotion. This suggests not only
a level of unhappiness, but a sense of disenfranchisement which, if continued, could lead to apathy and a continuing spiral of faculty relinquishing
control of academic matters to the administrative bureaucracy. This again
needs to be tested to see if there is any essential relationship between
faculty disenchantment and disenfranchisement to institutional structure
and reputational rankings. Although all reputational rankings are flawed in
some sense, they do provide a reference point.
In addition, let us emphasize that departments appear to operate
idiosyncratically, regardless of what might be occurring at the level of the
enterprise or even at the cross-enterprise level of the discipline. As already
noted, however, this finding is not so surprising in light of the fact that
departmental members come from many different enterprises, many different backgrounds, many different programs and have many different goals
and agendas.
It is noteworthy to mention again that, even though these enterprises
were classified according to statements in the faculty handbooks, they all
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function in much the same way—i.e., they all operate in a shared-governance fashion, with faculty making recommendations at the disciplinary
level and those recommendations traveling up the bureaucratic ladder to
the top spot where the final decision is made to approve or not approve the
recommendations. Also noteworthy is the fact that only administrators, not
rank and file faculty, serve on the university committee at Shared-Governance U; whereas at Collegial U only faculty serve on the universitywide
committee.
In an interesting comment, the chair of the universitywide committee
at Collegial U stated that “you have to learn who to trust and who not to
trust in the system. These are repeat players, so you see what, you know,
you get effective comparison. ... And so one of the first things one does as
one learns the system is understand who one is dealing with.” This implies
that things do not operate as smoothly as one would like and that the
process involves power plays, politics and personalities. This statement
upholds rather clearly Bachrach’s political model of the university.

Goals
Goals and objectives are the one really unifying aspect of this study.
Every institution appeared to be concerned with both “equity” (not ‘equality,’ but ‘fairness’) and reputation. In turn, departments were uniformly
concerned with fairness and reputation, but most of all with reputation.
As we have already seen, every department makes use of external
peer reviews of the “quality” of the work of candidates for promotion and
tenure. Although, as the associate provost at Bureaucratic U said, “What
has happened over the past 15 years increasingly, pretty much everyone
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uses it [peer review]. It started predominantly in the sciences and then
spread out in terms of the other disciplines.” This is one example of how
practices in the sciences have spread to other disciplines; another is the
dependence on published work in evaluating “productivity” and “value.”
In only one department does it appear that internal reviews may be
as important as external ones in the evaluation of an individual’s scholarship. This clearly extends the findings of research conducted at Stanford
University that found that faculty perceive their colleagues to wield more
influence and power in evaluations [Hind et al., 1974]. These findings
clearly uphold Alpert’s matrix model as it pertains to connections and
influence among different units and individuals in the discipline, but this
is a result of the reliance on external reviews—and external reviews necessarily come from faculty in the same discipline at other institutions
(whether university or business).
However, as Alpert pointed out, the “rating game” tends to produce
conformity, and the units with the greatest prestige rating wield power over
those less fortunate, as we have seen at Bureaucratic U. Additionally, this
is true among disciplines, as Alpert stated: A narrow definition of excellence has also served to impose the values of the most powerful disciplines
on the less prestigious disciplines and professional schools and, in the
process, has denigrated their intended purposes.” Perhaps, though,
Shared-Governance U’s attempts to define scholarship more broadly is an
attempt to break this pattern of dominance.
Another almost universal occurrence is the attempt to counsel into
leaving those who are not likely to make the grade. Is the attempt to counsel faculty out before the “up-or-out” decision has to be made an effort to
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“save face?” to increase the internal reputation—and thus the internal
power—of the department? or to avoid possibly acrimonious grievance
situations and lawsuits? In support of both the saving face theory and the
theory of internal power is the comment of the chair of psychology at Bureaucratic U: “Many years ago, we used to try to get somebody up as soon
as possible, and we’d think it was somewhat of an insult if the university
turned that person down. I’ve argued over the years that was foolish and
what we should do is wait and send up strong cases. ... [W]e like to send a
message to the college about the department when we send somebody up
for reappointment and promotion. We want to send up very strong cases.
And frankly, we want those cases to be, if you like, a notch or so above the
other units that are in the college.”
Another goal is to tenure faculty who will be “productive members of
the department.” Now, that phrase clearly has multiple meanings, as the
guidelines at Shared-Governance U indicate that the requirement for “collegiality” is part of the concept of productive. For some, productive means
producing published work—either abstracts in conference proceedings, or
books, or papers in refereed journals. But productive also means getting
external funds, being cited (although it is not clear if being cited in a negative sense is looked upon as a plus in the productivity column), producing
master’s and doctoral students, giving invited lectures, winning awards.
And, for those concerned with collegiality, it means serving on departmental committees (as well as university and professional committees) and
“working well” with colleagues.
The desire for a professor to be “collegial” is much more widespread
than we might have imagined, with the goal of “working well with others”
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and the avoidance of undue conflict appearing in eight of the eleven departments interviewed. But let us note that collegiality does not mean agreement. As the chair of English at Bureaucratic U said, “I think we all agree
it’s Tuesday, but beyond that, I’m not betting.” What collegiality does mean
is lack of severe conflict, as the chair of psychology at Bureaucratic U
noted, “I may want to go back and be a professor once again, and I want to
be listened to, too. ... So I tend to listen to my colleagues.” Does this mean
toeing the proverbial line? Not necessarily, although the danger is there.
And in academically weak departments the danger is much greater—note
that interviewees at the collegial Collegial U did not mention collegiality as
being an important factor. The importance of collegiality and what it means
for promotion and tenure warrants further exploration as this study was
able only to uncover its presence and prevalence.
Another goal, heavily tied to operation, is the desire—rather necessity—that a candidate be an excellent teacher and be involved with students. As the provost at Bureaucratic U said, it is the “and,” not “or.” As we
have seen, there are different views of how research informs teaching—and
only one person said he thought that there was only a weak connection, if
any. But even if there is no connection, the statement that good to excellent teaching is required is universal. Its relationship to research is also
almost a consistent one, with most department chairs of the opinion that
the relative importance of research to teaching is 45-45 or 40-45. Only one
department chair thought the spread was as much as 15 percentage points
(55-40, which leaves only 5 percent for service). There is no difference
among disciplines or among institutions on this topic—it is universal and
representative of a growing national concern and trend, perhaps a backlash against concept of the concept of the “ivory tower professor” who
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spends all his time on his own research and never touches down to contact
students. Or perhaps in some instances it is indicative of a growing recognition that to have a real university there need to be both students and
faculty who teach those students while conducting their own research and
scholarship.
Along this same line, we can find more than one university using the
term “student centered” in its mission statement, Bureaucratic U among
them. As one chair said, “It is our mantra—we are a research-intensive,
student-centered, learning community.”
What does this analysis finally tell us? First, we see that disciplines
look to themselves for a definition of value. The departmental attention to
the institutional requirements and goals is primarily one of knowing how
the land lies so that they can go through the appropriate motions to get
what they want. In this sense, we are seeing the university in light of
Bachrach’s political model.
Second, some level of discordance is evident in the more bureaucratic university. Administrators talked about a “buy-in” on the part of
faculty at both Bureaucratic and Collegial universities. Is there some way
to tease out the characteristics of a university that produce the greater
harmony? The suggestion is perhaps that internal harmony is a product of
the congruence of institutional and departmental goals and is perhaps
related to Cameron’s theory of effectiveness. This would certainly follow
logically from a large number of studies but has been outside the scope of
this research.
Third, Biglan’s findings of disciplinary differences are clearly in evidence in the operation of evaluating research but appear to have no bearing on the structure the department uses for its P&T process. Fourth, the
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institutional structure, according to the analysis in this study, bears no
relationship to the departmental structure in the P&T process. And, fifth,
since goals and the peer review requirement are almost universally the
same (excellence, national and international recognition, high quality, etc.),
we cannot relate them to any other aspect of the study in a meaningful
way. What is needed is a definition and understanding of how these subjective qualifications are derived—do they really mean conformity across
institutions, where, as Alpert suggested, the most prestigious departments
at the most prestigious institutions determine what is acceptable everywhere else? It would seem that this is strongly upheld by the simple fact of
the general reliance on external peer reviews for promotion and tenure. But
the English department at Collegial U injects a note of optimism here. They
seek free thinkers and are willing to take risks on new and controversial
ideas. The chair pointed out that they have hired people like . . . and . . .
“who were picked out early on . . . [as] people who are going to be leaders
in the profession.” This department is both willing and able to “take
chances on somebody who looks a little experimental, a little ahead of his
time . . .”

Recapitulation of Conclusions with Respect to Research
Questions
With respect to the initial research questions, we now have some answers
to the eight research questions of phases I and II:

Phase I
1.

To what extent does structure vary with respect to size, geo-

graphic location, history, cultural milieu, stated goals, level of operational
control, and external funding in different institutions?
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To what extent do goals vary with respect to size,

geographic location, history, cultural milieu, and external funding
in different institutions?
3.

To what extent do operations and level of centralized control

vary with respect to size, geographic location, history, cultural milieu,
mission and goals, and external funding in different institutions?
Because of the nature of the findings, I will answer these three questions together. According to the statistical analysis of demographic data for
all 31 state, land-grant enterprises for which I had usable data, there is no
significant relationship either among the demographics or between various
demographic data and goals, structure or operations. As we can see from
examining the charts of mean values (see Appendix E), the means are all
quite close. There is no significant difference, so no significant, meaningful
correlation between or among these data. Structure, goals and operations
do not depend on and are not statistically significantly related to, size,
cultural milieu, history (founding date), external funding, administrative
hierarchy or level of operational control, geographic location (size of local
town, commuting population, region of the country), or student body
make-up (numbers of graduates and undergraduates).
Phase II
There are five questions in Phase II, the interview phase of the research. I
will discuss the major findings and conclusions related to each one:
Discussion of promotion and tenure (or review) committee structures
(see Table 6, page 44) indicates little, if any, relationship to the authority
structure as indicated by content analysis of faculty handbooks. Committees in all departments interviewed at Collegial U are ad hoc, appointed by
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the chair. Committees at the other two enterprises are constituted in a
number of ways. Committees may be appointed or elected, with variations
within that structure such as an elected chair who appoints the committee,
or an elected committee with one member appointed by the department
chair. What is most striking in these arrangements is the lack of pattern.
Even at Collegial U, where all committees are ad hoc, two report to a subset of the department while one reports to the chair and the department.
We have now seen that departmental authority structures at both bureaucratic and shared-governance enterprises are largely collegial in nature,
and departmental authority structures at the collegial enterprise are constituted in a more bureaucratic fashion. We can thus conclude that the
authority structure of the enterprise is not related to the authority structure of the department.
With respect to the operation of promotion and tenure committees,
most report, for decisions on recommendations for tenure or promotion, to
a subset of the department, while one (psychology at Shared-Governance
U) reports to the department as a whole, including nontenured assistant
professors. Review committees at Collegial U generally report to the departmental faculty who are at or above the rank the candidate is applying for;
although, in one case the review committee sends separate reports to both
the chair and the faculty.
Voting is another aspect of the operations that has no pattern and
does not depend on the authority structure of the enterprise or of the departmental committee. In some cases the faculty making the recommendation decision vote by secret ballot, but most vote openly in a meeting. In
one case faculty vote by e-mail if they are not on campus. As we have seen,
some departments have “an oral tradition” of requiring a two-thirds or
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three-fourths vote of approval for a recommendation to pass beyond the
department to the next level of review. But, that chair noted that university
requirements stipulate that if a candidate wants the dossier “to go forward,” the department must send it on (Shared-Governance U). The English chair at Collegial U noted that a two-thirds majority vote is necessary
in that department, but not in others on campus, for a recommendation to
carry. “If there is a discrepancy of one vote either way, there’s an immediate re-vote, and that vote is final.” This department also does not allow email voting, although letters are accepted and read to the tenure staff—
“You can’t vote if you’re not at the discussion.” We have also seen that at
least one department requires external funding for award of tenure; and,
as we have also seen, this stipulation apparently is a direct contradiction of
institutional “policy.” Thus, we might now say that the operation of the
enterprise has little bearing on the operation at the departmental level;
neither does the authority structure of the enterprise have an effect on
departmental operations. There simply is too much variation and a decided
lack of pattern, much as we saw when we examined the congruence of
structure at the enterprise and departmental levels.
One universal factor in the review of research is the reliance on external peer reviews. Without exception, such reviews are required for tenure, though not always for promotion. The enterprise here often stipulates
a minimum number of outside letters (see Table 5, page 33). The department, however, is at liberty to request much more (one chair said that
they normally send out ten letters requesting external review and often
get six or seven back). But, since the requirement of peer review is univer -
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sal, we can make no distinction either among or between enterprise or
department.
Totally at variance with the lack of congruence between enterprise
and department with respect to structure and operation is the rather complete match between the two levels with respect to goals. But, let us note
that all enterprises and all departments are similar in this respect. All say
they want the best, the most outstanding, the most recognized, the ones
with “sustainable research programs,” excellence in research and teaching.
Goals, thus, are universal, with no discernable differences between an
enterprise and its departments or among equivalent departments at different enterprises.
When we examine the relationships and interactions between enterprise and department, we find, as noted above, that the most important is
the requirement of external peer review and the desire to promote and
tenure the absolute best (and it is normally stated in terms of promoting
and tenuring only the “best,” not the “best available.” The relationship
between enterprise and department or discipline is almost nonexistent with
respect to structure and so universal with respect to goals that it becomes
an almost meaningless comparison. It is only with respect to operation that
there appears to be an important relationship. This is particularly noticeable at Bureaucratic U, where the enterprise wants to see peer reviews
from scholars at its “peer institutions.” Department chairs here were
unanimous in their adherence to this stricture—one chair noting that he
would not want to send up a dossier that did not have at least one letter
from someone at an institution on the list of desired peer institutions.
We cannot conclude, however, that the differences in interactions we
see are due to the authority structure at the enterprise, especially in light
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of the fact that all departments at Bureaucratic U have their own by-laws
and promotion and tenure statements while none of the departments at
Shared-Governance U have such a document.
Of special interest is how some of the actors in the review of promotion perceive their relationships to the enterprise and to the discipline.
Some are wholly independent actors who see little relationship between
what they want in their department and what the enterprise wants. One
department at Shared-Governance U appears to follow its own path quietly, while another at that same enterprise railed against the restrictions
placed on it. But, most chairs said they and their departments were looked
upon favorably by the enterprise and had little or no conflict with it. Hints
of conflict with respect to affirmative action appointments appeared when
one chair noted that a departed faculty member would have been awarded
tenure by the enterprise against the wishes of the department. Noteworthy
in this respect was the statement by all chairs, even the ones who hinted at
conflict, that almost all recommendations of the department during the
past five or six years have been approved by the enterprise. Chief academic
officers mirrored this level of agreement when they said they overturn
departmental recommendations in only about 5 percent of the cases sent
to them, and those only when there was disagreement between departmental and college recommendations.
Knowledge of how and under what guidelines other disciplines evaluate research within the same enterprise are almost wholly lacking. That
was not a concern of the chairs and committee chairs I interviewed. What
was a concern was how they and their faculty are perceived by members of
their own disciplinary members at other institutions. They pay attention to
what others, outside of the local enterprise, are saying and doing. We might
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conclude that this is so because of the general assumption that the opinions of members of their own profession are those opinions that establish
the national and international reputations of their department and thus
have a direct bearing on their own professional lives. The suggestion that a
small number of “stars” set standards and criteria can be construed to
uphold Alpert’s contention that the peer review system is “a rating game
that places far greater rewards on conformity than diversity” and imposes
the values of the more powerful on the less powerful. Although Alpert was
talking about interdisciplinary influence, his remark would also hold for
intradisciplinary, interenterprise influence.

Future Studies
We have determined some interesting aspects of the evaluation of research
for promotion and tenure. Many of these—such as collegiality; levels of
satisfaction and contention; the relationship of satisfaction to goals, operation and structure; and definitions of scholarship—require further investigation. These are some of the ways the work begun in this paper might be
extended.
Another area that this study was not designed to examine in any
depth is the relationship of the roles of administrators in personnel matters
and their perception of their roles in the institution (they see themselves as
trendsetters and guides). Since this study was not designed to examine
upper administrators and their perceptions, actions and roles in any
depth, this would be a fruitful topic of investigation in the future.
Future studies should involve faculty in the different ranks rather
than the chairs of personnel/promotion committees. Chairs and other
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departmental administrators can provide one view of a departmental process. But to really understand this evaluation process, researchers need to
ask faculty (both tenured and nontenured) about their roles, their perceptions, their relationships with colleagues and with the administration of the
enterprise, their personal goals and how those relate to departmental and
institutional goals.
Along these same lines, and given the apparent popularity of the ad
hoc, chair-appointed structure for departmental personnel committees, it
seems worthwhile to investigate how the personality of the chair affects the
department and the promotion and tenure process. The potential for control and manipulation is clear. Is there a separation of personality from
departmental governance structure?
It has also been suggested that, as universities develop partnerships
with industry and government, and as legislatures demand and obtain
more and more control over the institution, the faculty is losing its involvement in setting standards in both curriculum and research. Also, as more
faculty resort to the courts to settle disputes about tenure, the courts are
rewriting faculty handbooks. Balch’s overview of the legal system’s involvement in higher education thus warrants another look.
Despite some drawbacks and the fact that this study has been able
to develop only tentative suggestions rather than solid conclusions, it has
pointed the way to fruitful and informative future research—research that
will help us understand the characteristics of promotion and tenure evaluations, how they develop, how and why they differ within the enterprise
and within the discipline.
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Appendix A

Interview Questions
Questions for chairs of departments:
1.

What criteria does your department use in evaluating re-

search for promotion? for tenure? (i.e., what are the contents of a P&T
file or dossier?)
2.

Are the criteria and standards used for evaluating research

in your department different from those used at the institutional level?
Defined differently?
3.

Are the criteria weighted? If so, how was this weighting

scheme determined and what is it?
4.

What are your departmental objectives for promotion? for

tenure?
5.

Does your department control its promotion and tenure

decisions?
6.

What is the relationship of research to teaching? to service?

7.

Describe the P&T committee (selection, qualifications, term

of service, responsibilities).
8.

Have you had any lawsuits or grievances resulting from the

promotion and tenure process in the past two years? how many? how
were they settled?
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Questions for chairs of P&T committees:
1.

What processes do you use in evaluating research for promo-

tion? for tenure? Do you rank order candidates?
2.

What is the importance of research in your department and

why is it important? What is its relationship to teaching?
3.

What indicators of creative activity do you use (papers, pre-

sentations, grants, students, peer reviews) and do you weight them? How
was the weighting scheme derived?
4.

Can you describe how the committee functions? Do other

members of the unit have a voice in the process? What about the
candidate’s role?
5.

What are the objectives of the committee in evaluating re-

search?
6.

How do you operationalize ‘highest quality’, ‘excellence’,

national reputation, etc.?

Questions for provosts and associate provosts:
1.

What is the importance of research and scholarship at your

university and why should it be important? What is its perceived relationship to teaching?
2.

How often do you disagree with departmental recommenda-

tions for promotion and tenure? What are some of the reasons?
3.

Is your approval of promotion and tenure recommendations

essentially a rubber stamp?
4.

Does the university make a distinction between applied and

pure research? How? Why?
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How would you describe the structure of your university

(bureaucracy, collegium, professional, oligarchy) and why?
6.

How much do faculty affect the goals, operation and stan-

dards of the university?
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Appendix B
Complete List of Terms Derived from Coding
of Interviews
abuse of guidelines
balance/integration
interrelationship of faculty functions
between teaching and research
environment
budget committee
buy-in
candidate screening
candidate statement for dossier
chair functions/responsibilities
collaboration
college guidelines/criteria
college review/decision
collegiality
comparisons/weighting
criteria
culture
demographics
department agreement
department decision/reputation
department objectives/standards
department satisfaction
department statement/by-laws
disagreement
equity/interpretation
evaluate research
expectations
faculty initiatives
flexibility
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funding
grievance
hiring
hiring chairs
institutional policy
involvement/governance
issues
mentoring
merit salary increase
miscellany
minority/gender issues
nonfaculty instructors
peer evaluation
portfolio
position description
process
promotion
P&T committee
promotion timing
provost goals
provost decision/responsibilities
provost disagreement
publications/communicating
pure vs. applied
quality/improvement
research definition
research importance
review — annual
review — post-tenure
review — third year
salaries
scholarship
service
shared agendas/governance
standards
structure
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students
teaching vs. research
teaching
tenure timing
trust
unit differences
university goals/principles
university guidelines
university-level decisions/agreement-disagreement/etc.
validation
voting
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Appendix C
Final List of Terms

budget committee
buy-in
candidate statement
chair functions/responsibilities
college guidelines/criteria
college review/decision
collegiality
department decision/reputation/standards
department satisfaction
department statement/by-laws
evaluation research
expectatons
faculty initiatives
funding
hiring
involvement/governance
mentoring
P&T committee
peer evaluation
promotion
provost decision/responsibilities/goals
publications/communicating
quality/improvement
research importance
reviews (annual)
shared agendas
teaching
tenure denial
tenure success
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unit differences
university level decisions/review
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Appendix D

Document Flow at for Promotion
and Tenure Dossiers at Collegial U
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Chief
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Final Decision

Prelim
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Solicit
letters

Candidate
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Candidate
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Dean/Department
Chair
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Appendix E

Results of Statistical Analysis
Figure E.1: Chi Square Analysis

Analysis of data shows no statistically significant relationship. Even though the cells are extremely small,
if there were a significant relationship between any of the variables, there would be at least a suggestion
of a fit.
It is worth noting here that the various reference books noted in the caption under Figure E.2 all contain
different data for the same variable. I selected data for this analysis based on a comparison of a
publication’s data for WVU with actual WVU data—e.g., I used the data from the volume that contained
WVU data closest to what I knew was correct.
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Legend: 1 = Bureaucratic

2 = Shared-Governance

Appendix E

Figure E.2: Calculations of Means

3 = Collegial
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Figures 1, 2 and 3 show calculations of the means of the values for the number of vice presidents (V-p), deans (acad deans) and all administrators (adm);
R&D funding per graduate student (RD/grad st),research expenditures per graduate student (res/grad st) and per faculty (res/#fac); number of volumes in the
library (lib books) and library budget (lib budget); student-faculty ratio (st/fac); and the percentage of baccalaureate (B-%), master’s (M-%) and doctoral (D%) degrees awarded. All financial information is for the 1992-93 fiscal year. All other data is for the 1993-94 fiscal year from several reference volumes on
higher education.(Barron’s, Peterson’s, the Blue Book, the World of Learning, Statistical Abstracts). It is clear that the means are very close in all categories.

Appendix E

Figure E.3: Graph of Means

166

Appendix E
Figure E.3 (continued)
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Abstract
The Evaluation of Research for Promotion
and Tenure: An Organizational Perspective
by Elsa G. Nadler
The literature on promotion and tenure in institutions of higher education includes a substantial amount of research on various aspects of
faculty productivity. Yet other research concentrates on the organizational structure of higher education. In his 1986 book, Burton Clark
called for research that would examine how what he called the enterprise
(the local university as opposed to the statewide system) and departments within it interact in important arenas.
This dissertation takes up Clark’s challenge to examine the interaction of enterprise and department in promotion and tenure in three
areas: goals, structure and operations. Content analysis of faculty handbooks from 25 Research I, land-grant institutions revealed that most of
those institutions (18 of them) can be classified as having a sharedgovernance authority structure (on the basis of the involvement of administrators and committees in the promotion and tenure process); three
are collegial, four bureaucratic. Interviews with department chairs and
chairs of promotion and tenure committees elicited information on how
the department orchestrates promotion and tenure, how it interacts with
disciplinary members outside of the enterprise, and how it interacts with
the enterprise. Interviews with administrators in charge of personnel
issues examined the goals of the enterprise with respect to promotion
and tenure and how it operated to attain those goals.
Analysis of interview transcripts indicate that there is little effect of
enterprise on department in the establishment of the department's authority structure for P&T evaluations. Neither is there much effect on the
actual process. And, although the enterprise would like to perceive itself
as setting criteria for evaluation of faculty, in fact the departments adhere to their own particularistic processes and structures, criteria and
agendas. Those criteria, however, are not always the same within disciplines across enterprises. What does remain the same across all entities
is the statement of goals that seek faculty who are of the highest quality,
the most productive, the most promising, the best teachers, the most
creative, and who have a sustainable and continuing research program.
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